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Francesco Patrizi was a competent Greek scholar, a mathematician, and a Neoplatonic thinker, well
known for his sharp critique of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. In this article I shall present, in
the first part, the importance of the concept of a three-dimensional space which is regarded as a body,
as opposed to the Aristotelian two-dimensional space or interval, in Patrizi’s discussion of physical space.
This point, I shall argue, is an essential part of Patrizi’s overall critique of Aristotelian science, in which
Epicurean, Stoic, and mainly Neoplatonic elements were brought together, in what seems like an original
theory of space and a radical revision of Aristotelian physics. Moreover, I shall try to show Patrizi’s dia-
lectical method of definition, his geometrical argumentation, and trace some of the ideas and terms used
by him back to Proclus’ Commentary on Euclid. This text of Proclus, as will be shown in the second part of
the article, was also important for Patrizi’s discussion of mathematical space, where Patrizi deals with the
status of mathematics and redefines some mathematical concepts such as the point and the line accord-
ing to his new theory of space.
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cept of a three-dimensional space which is regarded as a body, as
opposed to the Aristotelian two-dimensional space or interval, in
Patrizi’s discussion of physical and mathematical space. This point,
I shall argue, is an essential part of Patrizi’s overall critique of Aris-
totelian science, in which Epicurean, Stoic, and mainly Neoplatonic
elements were brought together, in what seems like an original
theory of space and a radical revision of Aristotelian physics. More-ll rights reserved.
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and his reasons for it, and trace some of the ideas and terms used
by him back to Proclus’ Commentary on Euclid.1
Francesco Patrizi of Cherso (1529–1597) is well known for his
sharp critique of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition.2 Thus,
for instance, he was not willing to accept even Aristotelian logic as
an important novelty of the Stagirite, claiming in the second partly from Proclus, whose doctrines are cited by Simplicius in his Corollarium de loco, in
fers to. Patrizi, who translated Proclus’ Elements of theology in 1583, used this text of
account of Patrizi’s discussion of physical space see Henry (1979); this article is based
ace in antiquity, with references to many of the classical sources (e.g., Plato, Aristotle,
count of the later tradition can be found in Grant (1981), especially pp. 199–206 on
e, his conclusion (on pp. 202–204) that space, according to Patrizi, is not body. For a
in Peter Auriol, see Schabel (2000).
his criticism and rejection of Aristotle; but one should be careful with regard to any
sance Aristotelianism see, e.g., Schmitt (1983, 1984), Cranz & Schmitt (1984). See also
& Schmitt (1992), pp. 60–126. Especially important for the present discussion are the
here was no exclusive commitment in humanist methodology or ideology to him or to
toic as well as Platonist and Aristotelian positions. And since Aristotle’s works were so
iderable time and energy to making Aristotelian texts clearer, more precise, and more
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new even in the field of logic.3 What about physics and mathemat-
ics? He dedicated two books, which were published separately in
1587 (entitled De rerum natura, libri duo priores. Alter de Spacio
Physico, Alter de Spacio Mathematico), and then incorporated into
his opus magnum, Nova de universis philosophia, published twice, in
1591 and in 1593, to the concept of physical andmathematical space;
this topic, which although (as specificallymentioned by Patrizi) it was
not part of the Aristotelian corpus, is also used by him to criticize con-
temporary Aristotelian philosophers in a rhetorical-methodological
remark at the beginning of his discussion of physical space.4 It has
been necessary to make this remark – which we shall shortly expand –
since Patrizi seems to present here the importance of what he
regarded as a completely new concept: the concept of space.
In the first book, on physical space, Patrizi reconstructs the
physical reality of the cosmos (and in fact, this section of his work
is entitled Pancosmia), its status and the relations between its dif-
ferent components on different levels of corporeal and incorporeal
being. He begins by pointing out, through a series of rhetorical
questions, that the existence of space (spacium) is the foundation
of everything else, its existence enables the existence of all other
levels of being: space is the first thing that God created, it is the
first being which is independent of, and superior to, all other
beings, and without which nothing exists.5 It is important to note
the essential connection between existence and space: being,
according to Patrizi, is related to, or determined by, a space, which
ensures existence. Thus, since the grades of reality exist, they exist
somewhere, in a place or a space which is beyond them and superior
to them. This means that existence is now related to either two or
three dimensions: length, breadth, or depth.6 At this stage Patrizi
uses the terms locus and spacium as synonyms, but as we shall see,
he will later distinguish between them in his hierarchy of beings
in the physical cosmos.7 We can already notice Patrizi’s geometrical
point of view, or as he himself puts it at the very beginning of his
work, the geometrical necessities which are included among the
ways he uses to prove his philosophy.8
But if the concept of space is indeed so important, Patrizi should
now explain (thus anticipating future criticisms by contemporary
Aristotelians) how it has been omitted in Aristotelian science,3 See Deitz (2007). On Patrizi’s critique of the Aristotelian doctrine of the elements see Va
be found in Kristeller (1966) pp. 110–126, with notes on pp. 175–177.
4 For a detailed discussion of the notions of space, light, and soul in Patrizi’s Neoplaton
(1999), and on space see especially pp. 146–151. See also the presentation, French translati
(1996). For an English translation of Patrizi’s book on physical space, and excerpts of his boo
(1941). For references to most of the modern scholarly discussions of Patrizi’s life, works,
5 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61r: ‘Quod autem illud fuit, quod summus opifex primum omnium e
ut essent eguerunt, et sine quo esse non poterunt, ipsum autem sine aliis esse poterat, et a
poni possunt omnia, quo ablato, alia omnia tollantur. Nam sine quo aliorum nihil est, et id s
spacium est. Omnia namque et corporea, et incorporea, si alicubi non sint nullibi sunt, si nu
naturae, neque qualitates, neque formae, neque corpora erunt. At hosce esse rerum gradus e
eventually create a space, see Deitz (1999), especially pp. 140–146. Note Patrizi’s own in
according to Patrizi, God created the space which separates heaven from earth. This beco
6 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61r: ‘Ergo hi rerum gradus sunt; si sunt, nullibi non sunt. Sunt ergo
duobus horum, aut in tribus. Spacium ergo ante haec omnia est. Et eo illa ut sint indigent
7 As shown by Algra there is no clear terminological distinction in ancient philosophy b
‘space’ (usually regarded as ). See Algra (1995), pp. 31–71.
8 Patrizi (1591), fol. 1r: ‘Franciscus Patricius, Novam, Veram, Integram, de universis co
ordine persecutus, Divinis oraculis, Geometricis necessitatibus, Philosophicis rationibus, cla
(1999), p. 140. These ‘geometrical necessities’ relate Patrizi to medieval and early modern d
Liber de causis and its influence, see Lohr (1986); see also Tummers (1980). For the early
9 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61r: ‘Amici quidam nostri e Peripato, cum duos a nobis libellos edito
princeps. Ridiculi sane, ac barbi homines, et scriptorum sui principis ignari. Quid enim ill
proprie magis locus est, ipse ridicule ommiserit? Quid aliud illi est magnitudo, super qua e
coelum esse spacium? Sed hos ommittamus. Qui quoniam Aristoteles de novo orbe nihil d
philosophemur, sensuumque testimoniis, rationumque probationibus utamur. Nulla mag
Veritatem, veritatis gratia inquiramus’. These words of Patrizi reflect the critical tone in th
Aristotelian discussion of place ( ), and with Aristotle’s and his followers’ identific
dimensions (‘and more specifically, Aristotelian physics. To this end, he ad-
dresses the following methodological assertion:
Some ‘friends’ of ours from the Peripatos, when they had read
[these] two books on space which were composed by me,
delightfully insulted me, since their own leader never wrote
anything of this sort. They certainly are ridiculous and stupid
human beings, and [also] ignorant of their own leader’s writ-
ings. Indeed, what else is a place for him [Aristotle], other than
a long and wide space? Although in a place [there is] depth,
which is more properly a [characteristic of] a place, he [Aris-
totle] ridiculously said nothing about it. What else is magnitude
for him [Aristotle], upon which every [kind of] movement,
upwards, downwards, sideways or in circle, takes place for
him? Do they not believe that between earth and heaven, there
is space? But let us just leave them [the Aristotelians], who,
since Aristotle said nothing about the new orbit, they do not
allow themselves to be persuaded that there is a new orbit.
Let us philosophize [by using] other intellects than those, let
us use the testimonies of the senses and the proofs of argu-
ments. Let us not be terrified by any great names. Let us inves-
tigate the things themselves, the truth in things, and the causes
of truth. Let us search for the truth, for the sake of truth.9
Patrizi is clearly distancing himself from the Aristotelian phys-
ics which he no doubt knows very well. He is introducing the con-
cept of space as the basis for a new physics, which should be
proved by both sense perception and reason, in search for the true
structure of reality. His references to Aristotle need some clarifica-
tion: what does he mean by saying that the Aristotelians do not
know well enough the writings of their own leader when they ar-
gue that Aristotle did not deal with the concept of space? And if
they are indeed wrong in this and he does discuss this concept,
what then is the basis of Patrizi’s criticism of Aristotle? The terms
(202a18–19; 211b8; 211b10; 211b17; 211b19; 212a3;
212a11; 213a28; 213a32; 214a5–6; 214a9–10; 214a20; 214a30;
216a35; 216b16; 216b32; 237b35; 238a7) and
(202b18–19) for instance, which are translated as spacium in the
Latin translations of Aristotle’s Physics, obviously attracted Patrizi’s
attention. But Aristotle of course never comes close to Patrizi’ssoli (2007). A good introduction to Patrizi and his place in Renaissance philosophy can
ic metaphysical system, with a special account of the importance of space, see Deitz
on, and notes by Hélène Védrine to Patrizi’s De spacio physico et mathematico in Patrizi
k on mathematical space, by Benjamin Brickman, see Patrizi (1943). See also Brickman
and philosophy, see Deitz (1999), pp. 158–159 nn. 3, 7.
xtra se produxit? Quid aut debuit, aut expedijt prius producit, quam id quo omnia alia,
liorum nullo eguit ut esset. Id enim ante alia omnia necesse est esse, quo posito, alia
ine aliis possit esse, necessario primum est, inquit Aristoteles quoque. Id autem ipsum
llibi sunt, neque etiam sunt. Si non sunt, nihil sunt. Si nihil sunt, neque animae, neque
xtra profundum, iam antea est dictum’. For Patrizi’s degrees, series, and chains, which
terpretation to Genesis 1, 1: ‘In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram’. Obviously,
mes very clear in his methodological remark cited and discussed in n. 9 below.
alicubi sunt ergo in loco, sunt ergo in spacio, aut longo, aut lato, aut profundo, aut in
, ipsum vero, ut sit, illorum indiget nullo’.
efore Epicurus and the early Stoics between ‘place’ (usually regarded as ) and
nditurus Philosophiam, sequentia, uti verissima, pronunciare est ausus. Pronunciata,
rissisimisque experimentis comprobavit’. These words are cited and discussed in Deitz
iscussions using the mos geometricus. For the medieval context, and especially for the
modern context see, e.g., Garber (1995).
s de spacio legissent, suavitur nos subsannarunt. Quoniam nihil tale scripsisset eorum
i, aliud est locus, quam spacium, longum, latumque? Tametsi in loco profundum, qui
i fit motus omnis, sursum, deorsum, in latus, in circuitum? An non credunt, a terra ad
ixerit, orbem novum esse, minime sibi persuaderi sinunt. Alijs quam talibus ingeniis
na nomina exhorreamus. Res ipsas, verumque in rebus, verique causas vestigemus.
e opening lines of Simplicius’ Corollarium de loco, expressing dissatisfaction with the
ation of place as an interval ( ), thus regarding place as having only two
’). See Diels (1882), p. 601.
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sion, and the very basic notions of vacuum and movement are totally
different according to Patrizi.
After stating that bodies, forms, and qualities are all intimately
related to space,11 Patrizi claims that the soul and its three parts are
connected to space as well: the sensitive part is distributed through-
out the body; with regard to the other two (which he calls ratio and
mens), if indeed they provide the forms of the body, then they are ex-
tended through bodies just like other forms. Patrizi is again criticiz-
ing Aristotle on this point, claiming that if the soul is in the body, it is
not there as forma (a form), but rather as formatrix (the element
which forms).12 The word formatrix is not classical and is rather rare
in medieval texts. It is probable that Patrizi is reflecting here some-
thing which he found in his Greek Neoplatonic sources. Terms such
as or come to mind.13 But there is also an-
other possibility. The active role given to the soul here can be com-
pared with the active role given to the soul in creating mathematical
concepts by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid, which is also a cri-
tique of the Aristotelian notion of direct abstraction from matter or
sense perception as the process through which mathematical con-
cepts are formed.14 The Latin word formatrixwhich refers to the soul
in Patrizi’s discussion, can be regarded as an echo of Barozzi’s se ip-
sum producit, et a proprio producitur principio, et vita seipsum explet,
ab opificeque sine corpore, ac sine dimensione expletur. In the Greek
we have
.
Patrizi seems to neglect the distinction between material and
immaterial substances while dealing with physical space: space,
the first and superior being which is body, is essentially connected
to all other beings through their corporeality. Every being is thus
redefined according to its relation to space. He is using a probabi-
listic method of dialectical definition according to which every10 For one example see Aristotle’s Physics 214a9–12: ‘
Aristotle’s Physics, see Bossier & Brama (1990), index graeco-latinus, ‘ ’ and ‘
peripateticae of 1581; on this text see Kristeller (1966), p. 115. For some medieval Aristotelia
Marsilius of Inghen and others, see Grant (1981), pp. 121–134. And see Grant’s remarks o
created infinite spaces . . . their discussions are too vague to stand as proper precursors to
different notions of space between Patrizi and a contemporary thinker, Tommaso Campanel
206–213.
11 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61r: ‘Quoniam corpora circumquaque intus et extra, spacio et circun
dimensionem. Qualitates, calor, frigus, humidum, siccum, molle, durum, reliquas, quis non
per corpora, et ipsa protensa esse reperiatur, et eorum externa attingere, et interna habita
12 Ibid.: ‘Vita itidem et ea anima, quae sensitiva dicitur, si per instrumenta corporis sit dist
videtur Aristoteles voluisse, et quod nobis hactenus maxime est dubium) sicuti formae a
formatrix, quia corpus in spacio est, ipsa quoque erit in spacio’. The idea that the soul is t
13 In Proclus’ Platonic theologywe have the word in relation to the soul; see Pro
a discussion of and ; see Proclus (1864), 1148
14 See (for style comparison) the Latin translation of Francisco Barozzi, in Barozzi (1560),
per collectionem eorum, quae in singulis sunt communium, neque prorsus posterius genite
ipsas accipere’; and pp. 9–10: ‘Cuncte igitur res Mathematice primum in ipsa sunt anima
animales; et ante ea, que concinnata sunt, harmonice Rationes; et ante corpora, que circul
anima, et iste ornatus alius est, qui se ipsum producit, et a proprio producitur principio, et v
suas promit rationes, tunc omnes patefacit scientias, atque virtutes’. For the Greek see Procl
see, e.g., Metaphysics 1059b6–16.
15 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61r–v: ‘Sin vero corpus sit in anima, haec si divisibilis sit, in spaci
indivisibilis sit, ut est, in spacio erit indivisibili, et a divisibili spacio circumque erit obvolu
supra coelum, in spacio certe erit. Si vero sit ubique, in spacio, non esse nequit. Sunt ergo en
antequam entia extra profundum prodirent, spacio eguerunt, quo ipsum est circumvolutum
Itaque spacium, a primo uno, ante entia alia omnia est profusum, et veluti spiritu oris eius e
spacium in rerum sit universitate. Sed indagandum, an spacium sit aliquid’. Notice profundu
could be a combination of the Hebrew of Gen 1,1, which Jerome translates as terra. . . inan
16 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61v: ‘Communis quaedam omnium hominum notio, spacium, et e
Distantia, Intervallum, Intercapedo, Spacium, Diastasis, Diastema. Consensus hic Latinorum
in mundo distare? Orientem ab Occidente? Pedes capite in se ipso? In capite oculum ab ocu
legere, aut intelligere, non laboret’.hypothetical possibility (either negative or positive) is related to
space. In this way space becomes the first absolute being to which
all other beings are related:
But if indeed the body were in the soul, if this [soul] would be
divisible, it will be in divisible space. If [this soul] were indivis-
ible, it will be in indivisible space. But if the whole of divinity
were indivisible, as is the case, it will be in indivisible space,
and it will be covered all around by divisible space. Likewise,
if [divinity] were nowhere, it would not be thinkable without
space; if it were somewhere, either at the top of heaven or
above heaven, it will certainly be in space. If indeed [divinity]
were everywhere, it cannot not be in space. Therefore, all
beings, and those things which are above beings, are in space.
And they cannot not be in space. Accordingly, before beings
came out of the depth, they required space, by which depth
itself was surrounded, so that they would come out of the
depth, and would endure, if at all beings should or could exist.
And thus space flowed from the first one, before all other
beings, and it is blown and dispersed in the finite and in the infi-
nite as by the breath of its mouth. Therefore, we should no
longer examine whether space exists in the wholeness of things,
but rather explore whether space is something.15
We can notice the rhetorical power of Patrizi’s arguments which re-
fer to both ontological and epistemological levels. It is also remark-
able how Patrizi combines physics and cosmology on the one hand,
and theology on the other, while discussing the relations between
space and divinity.
In dealing with the question whether space would be some-
thing, Patrizi begins by mentioning the different terms for space
which he found in his Latin and Greek sources, immediately mov-
ing on to describe some ‘proofs’ for the existence of space based on
sense perception.16 Then, he strongly connects space and existence,
by arguing, through a presentation of several rhetorical questions;
’. For spatium in a Latin translation of
’, p. 364. For Patrizi’s familiarity with the Aristotelian corpus see his Discussiones
n discussions of extracosmic void space by Henry of Ghent, Jean de Ripa, John Buridan,
n p. 385 n. 123: ‘Although Jean de Ripa and John Major may have believed in actual
Patrizi. Scholastics were almost unanimous in denying a creation of space’. For the
la, see Grant (1981), p. 196; for some later reactions to Patrizi’s notion of space see pp.
dantur, et occupantur. Formae vero toto corpore extensae, eamdem trinam occupant
videt, et extra, et circa, et intra corpora esse protensas? Si vero, natura, de qua postea,
re, ipsa quoque in spacio esse erit dicenda’.
ributa, per spacia erit distributa. Sin vero ratio, et mens animae corpus informet, (quod
liae per corpora erunt extensa. Sin vero anima sit in corpore, non ut forma, sed ut
he form of the body is discussed in Aristotle’s De anima 414a4–14.
clus (1968–1997), Vol. 1, p. 65. In Proclus’ commentary to Plato’s Parmenides we have
.5–9 and 1148.12–39. I would like to thank Dr. Leen Van Campe for this last reference.
p. 9: ‘Quod si neque per abstractionem materialium Mathematice formae sunt, neque
, et a sensibus: necesse est utique animam aut a se, aut a mente, aut et a se et a mente
, et ante Numeros, Numeri, qui per se moventur; et ante apparentes Figuras, Figure
ariter moventur, invisibiles Circuli producti sunt. Horumque omnium ubertas ipsa est
ita seipsum explet, ab opificeque sine corpore, ac sine dimensione expletur, et quando
us (1873), 15.16–20 and 16.22–17.5. For Aristotle’s notion of the mathematical process
o erit divisibili. Si indivisibilis sit, in spacio erit indivisibili. Sed si divinitas universa
ta. Si nullibi item sit, sine spacio non cogitatur, si sit alicubi, vel in coeli culmine, vel
tia cuncta, et ea quae supra entia sunt, in spacio. Et in spacio, non esse nequeunt. Igitur
, ut extra ipsum prodirent, et consisterent, si entia esse aut debuerunt, aut potuerunt.
fflatum atque diflatum in finitum, atque infinitum. Non ergo amplius quaerendum an
m here, out of which all things seem to have emerged at some point in the past, which
is et vacua, and the of the Platonic Timaeus.
sse, et aliquid esse videtur voluisse, cum nomina haec, vel talia formaret, Dimensio,
Graecorumque a sensu videtur ortum habuisse. Quis enim non cernit, coelum a terra,
lo? Ab ore nares? Si quis has distantias, seu intervalla, sive spacia non discernat, haec
246 A. Edelheit / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (2009) 243–257regarding being and not being, that if something is, it is being (si est
aliquid, ens est).17
Next, Patrizi moves on to describe what sort of a thing space is.
Here we find for the first time in the discussion of space his geo-
metrical point of view. Patrizi, following the ancients (veteres), dis-
tinguishes between three spaces: length, represented by a line;
breadth, represented by a surface; and depth, which together with
the other two spaces they called a body.18 Then, following the
mathematicians, he regards length without breadth as the first space
or interval; breadth as the second; and depth as the third. Moreover,
Patrizi contends, these three spaces cannot be regarded separately:
they are connected to each other and dependent upon one another;
and through this connection body is formed.19 Following the philos-
ophers of nature, Patrizi regards the natural body as containing not
only the three former spaces (length, breadth, and depth), but also
resistance.20 We can find these three spaces in all separate bodies,
either mathematical or natural, which are perceived by both mind
and senses.21 It is important to notice that for Patrizi the notion of
space is not abstract but very concrete, and so both the mind and
the senses can grasp it without any difficulty. As we shall see, math-
ematics is the science of space, through which we can have a more
detailed knowledge about space and everything which is in space;
we do not need mathematics in order to prove the existence of
space: we know it through our mind and feel it through our senses.
Patrizi regards also qualities as corporeal matters, through
which space and its three parts are extended. While space creates
bodies, bodies or parts of them contain qualities.22 Bodies and qual-
ities are thus instruments of space through which it extends. The dif-
ference between bodies and qualities is that while space is essential
in bodies, it is only accidental in qualities; it means that qualities are
completely dependent for their very existence upon bodies and
space, without which there can be no qualities.23 It is important to
notice that everything in the physical cosmos described by Patrizi
is defined according to space and according to its position in space.17 Ibid.: ‘Cessavit ergo, primo statim speculationis huiusce ingressu, quaestio illa. An spa
quidem fuerit, sed nihil fuerit. Hanc rem, ita discutiamus. Ens, et non ens, idemne sunt,
consensus philosophorum omnium declaravit, sicut et hoc aliud. Si est aliquid, ens est. Si v
connumeratur. Non ergo spacium, et erit aliquid, et in entium numero; et simul non erit
pedes est; de numero entium est, et est aliquid. Et ita de ceteris intervallis quibuscunque
18 Patrizi (1591), fol. 61v: ‘Consensus veterum communis, tria spacia esse docuit. Long
duabus vocaverunt corpus’.
19 Ibid.: ‘Ita, ut Mathematici, qui sese nusquam errare profitentur, docuerint, longitudinem
profunditatem tertium. Ita tamen ut latitudo, considerari nequeat nisi praecedente, et coniu
et sibi coniungantur. Et sicut illa prima, lineam per se sola efficit, sic duae coniunctae
mathematicum’.
20 Ibid.: ‘Physicorum vero probatissimi, dixerunt, corpus naturale esse, quod constat, ex lo
quod habet tres diastases (hoc est distantias) cum antitypia’.
21 Ibid.: ‘In corporibus ergo singulis, qualiacumque illa sint, vel mathematica, vel natura
22 Ibid., fols. 61v–62r: ‘Corporeas autem res eas appello, quas vocant qualitates, calore
occupant, vel partes eorum. Hoc est, vel superficies operiunt, vel etiam penetrant profund
concludemus, dimensiones has, atque distantias, et per eas, spacium simpliciter, in corpor
23 Ibid., fol. 62r: ‘Qualitates namque non sunt quantae, aut magnae, aut longae, aut lata
corpora quae, et quanta sunt, et magnitudinem habent, et trine sunt dimensa protenduntur.
The notion of quality as presented here by Patrizi is not very common either among ancien
compared with the way this term is discussed about one hundred years before Patrizi, in Ma
study, but we can mention here that for Ficino, quality is regarded as one stage above corpo
book; see Ficino (2001–2006), Vol. 1, p. 16: ‘Proinde cum huc ascenderimus, hos quinqu
deum—invicem comparabimus’. Somehow closer to Patrizi are Ficino’s words ibid., p. 274, e
the other: ‘Qualitas enim quia situ et partibus terminata est atque uni cuidam est addicta
movere, et quaelibet qualitas unicum opus agit et ad unicum movetur terminum. Quid ca
deorsum. Numquam igitur qualitas contrarium aliquem effectum principalis sui operis f
discedet sponte quo se naturaliter contulit’. See also Muccillo (1986), especially pp. 670–6
24 Patrizi (1591), fol. 62r: ‘Sed spacium esse, et esse aliquid, et trinum esse; et in corpore
demonstratum’.
25 Ibid.: ‘an ullum sit aliud spacium, quam quod singulis inest corporibus’.
26 Ibid.: ‘Locus ergo tria spacia habet, quae habet omne corpus, et tamen locus non est c
27 Ibid., fol. 62v: ‘Ergo locus, quia corpus non est, necessario erit spacium trina dimen
longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem in se recipiat, et capiat. Et spacium tale trinu
aequale. Locus ergo proprium spacium habet, diversum a spacio corporis proprio’. It is p
, cited in Algra (1995), pp. 35–36As we shall see, also mathematics as a science is determined accord-
ing to space, since it is regarded as the science of space par excellence.
This means again no separation between an ontological and an epis-
temological level.
Before going on to the next question Patrizi makes an interest-
ing remark regarding his method of demonstration. Obviously he
does not use scholastic syllogisms, but rather regards what he
has just presented as sermone demonstratum.24 Without putting
too much emphasis on the term sermo, we can say that by using it
here Patrizi is relating himself to the humanist philosophers and to
the humanists in general, who emphasized the power and impor-
tance of speech and rhetoric (artes sermonales). This does not mean
that Patrizi uses rhetoric without reasonings, or precise definitions
of terms; it only means that his notion of demonstration is flexible,
and that he is aware of the different ways and levels of demonstra-
tion, presentation, and persuasion in a philosophical and scholarly
discourse.
The next question deals with the ontological independence of
space, or whether there is some other space beyond that which
we find inside single bodies.25 In order to prove the existence of
space outside bodies Patrizi introduces another term: place (locus),
which is different from body. It contains the same three spaces
(length, breadth, and depth), but still it is not body.26 What is it
then?
Therefore a place, since it is not a body, by necessity it will be
a space which is provided with triple dimension, length,
breadth, and depth, through which it would gain for itself
and take hold of length, breadth, and depth of the placed body.
And such triple space is a real place, a different [space] from
the placed [space of the body], immovable by itself, and
wheresoever turned towards, it is like the placed body. A place
then has its own space, which is other than the particular
space of a body.27cium sit. Sed forsan non cessat alia illa. An spacium sit aliquid? Forte enim spacium
vel non idem? Si idem, ergo aliquid et est, et non est. Hoc autem impossibile esse,
ero non est, iam nihil est. Hoc enim e numero entium excluditur, sicut illud inter entia
aliquid, et e numero entium reiectum. Ergo spacium, et distantia, quae in homine ad
’. On this see Deitz (1999), p. 148, and p. 163 n. 46.
itudinem, sive lineam. Latitudinem, seu superficiem. Profunditatem, quam cum illis
sine latitudine, primum spacium, seu mavis intervallum esse. Latitudinem secundum;
ncta longitudine, neque profunditas per se consistere queat, nisi duae illae antecedant,
superficiem conficiunt; atque ita tres simul iunctae corpus formant, quod vocant
ngitudine, latitudine, profunditate, et antitypia, quod est resistentia. Itidem, corpus est,
lia, spacia tria reperiuntur, quae et mente, et sensu percipiuntur’.
m, frigus, albedinem, nigredinem, et reliquas. Vel enim tota corpora intus, et extra
a; atque ita per tres illas dimensiones, ac spacia, ipsae quoque protenduntur. Itaque
eis rebus, hoc est, per corpora protensis, reperiri sicuti in corporibus ipsis’.
e, aut profundae per se, et sui natura, sed sunt tales ex accidenti, quia nimirum per
Est ergo in iis, spacium, sed alienum. Est itidem in corporibus omnibus, sed proprium’.
t or among medieval thinkers. In the context of Renaissance philosophy, it should be
rsilio Ficino’s Platonic theology, for instance. Such a detailed comparison is beyond this
ris moles in his five-stages structure of reality, presented in the first chapter of the first
e rerum omnium gradus—corporis videlicet molem, qualitatem, animam, angelum,
mphasizing the connection between quality on the one hand, and mater and nature on
materiae, agit etiam terminate fatigaturque, ut nequeat aut semper aut eodem modo
lor agit nisi calorem, frigus frigiditatem? Levitas sursum trahit solum; gravitas vero
aciet natura sua, numquam ad locum unde discessit sponte redibit, numquam inde
71.
is, corporibusque omnibus reperiri, proprium, et alienum, satis est superiore sermone
orpus’.
sione praeditum, longitudine, latitudine, atque profunditate, quibus corporis locati
m, verus est locus, aliud a locato, immobile per se, et locato corpori quaqua versum
erhaps relevant here to mention Sextus’ remark (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3, 134) that
n. 17. For Sextus in the Renaissance see, e.g., Cao (2001), Floridi (2002).
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in the order of nature.28 In the same order, as we have seen, body
comes before quality.
Thus, in Patrizi’s physical space, quality is added to body, body
is placed in a place, and a place is in fact a space which is filled with
body. A vacuum is defined as an empty place or a space without
body which contains the same three dimensions: length, breadth,
and depth. Basically, Patrizi stresses, vacuum, space, plenum, and
place are the same.29 After presenting what he regards as experi-
ments, together with arguments, showing the existence of vac-
uum,30 Patrizi concludes that sense perception, experimental
knowledge, and reason, all show the existence of empty spaces in
the world.31 And what about outside the world? Also there, our phi-
losopher claims, there is an empty space, and the authority of Aris-
totle are not valid enough to refute it; but then, how will it be
possible to prove such an idea? Sense perception cannot help us, nei-
ther can any authority among the ancients. Here, Patrizi suggests
that we should use sound or intelligent reasons (rationes sensatae).32
These kind of reasons help us to prove a hypothetical assumption
that there is an empty space outside the world, where no sense per-
ception can reach, and although Aristotle’s arguments are against
such a possibility, it is important to notice that the ontological struc-
ture of reality (the existence of empty space outside the world)
determines our epistemological instruments (sound or intelligent
reasons). Thus, the Ram of the zodiac has, according to the astrolo-
gers, a certain length and breadth which is in the inmost surface of
heaven, or in the profound body of heaven, and in the internal mass;
but why, Patrizi asks, would this surface not be continuous, and cor-
respond with the most remote and extreme surface of the same hea-
ven as well? It is necessary that heaven as a body should have a
surface, upon which are the lengths and breadths of the signs of
the zodiac (which can be bigger and smaller than the Ram), and such
a contiguous surface requires bigger and bigger space which is
empty. If, Patrizi contends, from the beginning and the end of each
sign lines are drawn all the way towards both poles through the
same surface of heaven, an image of a pumpkin is created, which
these lines divide into twelve equal parts. It is necessary that each28 Patrizi (1591), fol. 62v: ‘Locus enim natura, ante corpus ita est, sicut corpus est, ante co
est’. It is important to notice that Patrizi uses here the same formulation he used earlier w
29 Ibid.: ‘Re autem vera eadem res essent, vacuum, spacium, plenum, et locus. Qua plenu
huic necesse est, communes esse tres illas dimensiones, longitudinem, latitudinem, et pr
spacium’.
30 Ibid., fol. 63r–v. A critical assesment of the experiments presented here by Patrizi, whi
evidence rather than anything close to the seventeenth-century new scientific approach, c
31 Patrizi (1591), fol. 63v: ‘Et natura ergo, et arte adhibita, esse, et posse esse in mundo
demonstravit’.
32 Ibid.: ‘Extra autem mundum universum, inane spacium esse, nihil obstant Aristotelis
tempus nullum esse contendit. Neque enim negavit, spacium inane ibi esse. Sed negavit, tal
esse, neque tamen rationibus id demonstrasset; nihil nobis obstasset, quin spacium ibi ess
pertingit, neque ullius authoritate, quam tamen aliorum veterum, Aristotelicae contrapone
demonstremus’. The phrase rationes sensatae is not common in Latin, and it might repre
which can be found in Proclus (1873), 16.19 and 16.25.
33 Patrizi (1591), fol. 63v: ‘Dicimus ergo inter stellas fixas, duodecim esse signorum Zodi
Astrologi, rerum coelestium gnari, longum esse ponunt gradus xxx, latum xij, sicuti Zodia
corpore profundo, atque interna mole. Cur non sit etiam hisce continuata, et corresponde
habet, vel non habet? Si dicatur non habere, ridiculum fiet, ut vel coelum non sit corpus, ve
superficiem habeat, et necesse est eam longam, et latam esse, vel xxx illos, et xij gradus,
necesse est alterumtantum, spacii illius inanis ei contiguum esse, xxx scilicet gradus long
protrahantur, semper maius, ac maius spacium compraehendent’; ‘Si vero a principio, et
protrahantur, instar peponis cuiusdam eam in xii partes aequales dispescent. Quarum par
Atque ita universum coelum, ac mundus universus extimo spacio circundabitur necessario
34 Ibid.: ‘Quae res ita clara modo facta est, ut si quis de ea dubitet amplius, dubitem an
35 Ibid.: ‘Verum si quis amplius amet audire, audiat, et haec. Veterum elegantissimi quid
resolvatur, tum centies millies, et forte amplius, maiorem occupabit locum’. This Stoic theor
65r. For a general account of Stoicism in the Renaissance see Kraye (2007), especially pp. 9
used here by Patrizi comes, as shown in Deitz (1999), p. 150 and p. 164 n. 56, from Cleome
Todd (1982).
36 Patrizi (1591), fol. 63v: ‘At locus hic, spacium illud fuerit inane, quod corpore replent
Idque cogitatione compraehenderunt ii, qui hoc dogma intulerunt, non absimili ab ea abstra
absurdum, ita illi cogitationi conflagrationis, absurdi sequetur nihil’.of these parts shall have just as many continuous parts of empty
space. And so, it is necessary that the whole heaven and world
should be surrounded by an outermost space.33
Ratio sensata is, then, according to Patrizi, taking some assump-
tions from an accepted theory, say in astrology (without proving
them or declaring that they are correct or valid), through which
we can start a critical examination of a thesis or an idea (the exis-
tence of an empty space surrounding the world) which is beyond
the senses and against most authorities; this examination includes
looking for consistency in the overall cosmic picture which is de-
rived from these assumptions, and looking for a hidden assump-
tion which can connect this cosmic picture with the thesis under
discussion (in this case, the existence of a continuous surface of
heaven which requires an empty space). Once again we notice that
the cosmic picture described here by Patrizi is that of a geometrical
cosmos which contains bodies, lines, surfaces, places, and spaces.
This ratio sensata is totally clear, and if someone still has some
doubts, Patrizi says, it is evident that something is wrong with
his eyes and mind.34 But if someone would like to know more about
this issue, Patrizi immediately introduces the first among three ref-
erences in his discussion of the physical space to a known Stoic the-
ory: the cosmic conflagration ( ). This is, in fact, another
ratio sensatawhich shows the existence of an empty space surround-
ing the world: if the world is going to end up in vapors or smoke,
then it will occupy a much bigger place.35 And here we come back
to the idea of an empty space:
But this place would be that empty space, that when a body
refills it, it will be called a place, but now since no body fills
it, it is only an empty space. And they perceived this idea by
means of thought, those who introduced this dogma, not differ-
ent from that abstraction, which other natural philosophers use
in the thinking out of [their] doctrines. And just as there is noth-
ing absurd following on these [ideas], so also on this speculation
of the conflagration nothing absurd follows.36
We have here exactly the same structure of the ratio sensata we
have seen before, in the discussion of the Ram.rporea. Nam sine quo aliorum nihil est, et id sine aliis possit esse, necessario, primum
ith regard to space. See n. 5 above.
m corpore est, esse locum. Qua vero sine corpore est, esse vacuum. Atque ideo vacuo
ofunditatem, sicuti et loco. Et vacuum ipsum, non aliud esse, quam trine dimensum
ch are regarded as a repetition of the classical and medieval arsenal of experimental
an be found in Schmitt (1981), VII. And see also Deitz (1999), p. 164 n. 51.
vacua, et inania spacia, sensus ipse, et experientia, et ratio ex hisce ducta clarissime
aut authoritas, aut rationes. Quibus extra coelum; locum, vacuum, corpus, motum,
e vacuum esse, quod corpus caperet, et locus fieret. Et si maxime negasset, spacium ibi
e, rationibus ostendere possemus. Probemus itaque, non quidem sensu, qui illuc non
re haberemus. Sed rationibus fere sensatis, extra mundum spacium esse, illud inane
sent again some of Patrizi’s Greek sources. One can think for example of the phrase
aci figuras, cum aliis non paucis. Signum unum integrum sumamus. Esto Arietis. Hoc
ci signa reliqua. Longitudo haec Arietis, est in intima coeli superficie: est, et in coeli
ns in coeli eiusdem extima superficie, et suprema? Vel enim ibi superficiem coelum
l sit corpus, sine supeficie. Quae si falsa sunt, necesse est, ut coelum extimam quoque
vel maiores, vel minores alios. Si ergo signi in ea superficie longitudo est, et latitudo,
um, xij latum. Et quanto a coeli superficie extimae lineae Arietem includentes, magis
fine cuiusque signi lineae per superficiem coeli eandem, usque ad utrumque polum
tium singulae, totidem spacii inanis illius partes sibi contiguas necessario habebunt.
’.
compos oculorum, et mentis fiet’.
am Physici autumarunt, mundum hunc conflagraturum. Si in vapores, vel in fumum
y is again mentioned and related to the existence of an empty space on fol. 64r and on
9–102. For the classical context see Algra (1995), pp. 261–339. This specific argument
des. On Cleomedes see, e.g., Algra (1995), pp. 268–270. On Patrizi and Cleomedes see
e, locus nuncupabitur, nunc nullo implente corpore, inane tantummodo est spacium.
ctione, qua Physici alii in mathematum intellectione utuntur. Et sicut his nihil sequitur
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thought experiment: if the whole world can be considered by the
mind as being moved from its place, then, this is further evidence
for the existence of that empty space around it.37 This may also be a
ratio sensata, but different from the two we have just seen.
Moving on to some historical account of ancient opinions (most
of them taken from the Stoics) concerning empty external space,
and whether it is finite, infinite, or just the biggest among all
things,38 Patrizi chooses to follow his own path, using again his geo-
metrical point of view:
While proceeding through another path we say that the space
which is outside the world is both finite and infinite. It is indeed
finite on that side which touches the most remote surface of the
world. Indeed, [this side has no] special and natural limit of its
own, but only the world’s boundary. But in that [side] in which
[space] is separated from the world, and it is far departed from
it, it becomes infinite.39
Here we have another example of Patrizi’s flexible notions
and his rejection of dichotomies, according to which the same
thing can be finite on one level, and infinite on another level.
On a logical level this is of course impossible. But in Patrizi’s
geometrical cosmos and its ontological and epistemological
structure, there is no contradiction: space can be absolutely fi-
nite on the side which touches the world, or with regard to
the comprehension of our mind, and still be absolutely infinite
in its nature.40
This conceptual flexibility enables Patrizi to begin his distinc-
tion between the four different parts or levels of the physical
space: empty space (spacium inane), place (locus), body (corpus),
and quality (qualitas). The last three are contained in the world
(mundus), which is another term used by Patrizi. The only differ-
ence between empty space and place-space is that place-space sets
the world, it is full of the world’s body, while empty space is empty
of any kind of body. This means that, as we have already seen,
empty space is both finite and infinite, while place-space is only fi-
nite.41 Here we have the starting point of an accidental hierarchy be-
tween these levels of physical space. Patrizi stresses that the fact37 Ibid.: ‘Si mundus universus mente cogitetur suo loco moveri, inane illud spacium, nece
long tradition of discussions in antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages, concerning the po
Sermones, L, 10; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 103, a. 1.
38 Patrizi (1591), fol. 64r: ‘Spacium hoc, quod mundum universum, undequaque extrinsec
omnium maximum dixerunt. Hoc qui asseruit, a vero non aberravit, Thales Milesius, ra
respondit. Alia namque omnia, mundus continet; locus vero mundum ipsum. Optime in
Posidonius vero, infinitum non esse docuit, sed tantum, quantum sufficiat ad capiendum
rationibus id confirmarunt, nequaquam constat’. For some of the ancient sources see Diel
39 Patrizi (1591), fol. 64r: ‘Nos alia ingredientes via, dicimus, spacium quod est extra m
superficiem contingit; non quidem proprio, et naturali fine suo, sed mundi terminis. Qua
40 Ibid.: ‘Nam si infinitum uno sit, omnibus etiam necessario est infinitum: praeterquam
naturam eius non mutat, nec ab infinitate sua dimovet’.
41 Ibid., fol. 64v: ‘In eo tantum differunt, ut alterum [locus], quod mundum locat, sit plenum
differt hoc ab illo, quod illud, et finitum est, et infinitum, hoc autem totum est finitum’.
42 Ibid.: ‘Et qua plenum est, non equidem ad eius pertinet essentian, sed plenitudo ei acci
ita, ut spacia, ut propria corporum superius diximus, accidentia fere sunt illis, essentia ve
mundano accidit; vacuum esse ad essentiam eius pertinebit’. Notice that the word renitenti
as well as his originality.
43 Diels (1882), p. 601: ‘
’. Proclus is the only one who is mentioned by Simplicius as someon
this issue (his lost ), and since Patrizi decided to follow this philosophic
should be regarded as quite original and new, certainly in the Latin philosophical and scie
44 Patrizi (1591), fol. 64v: ‘Nam, et dimidia mundani spacii pars vacua est, et universum il
se implentia exercet corpora. Ita, ut ea cuncta, nihil resistentia, eorum resistente, aut obstan
prorsus renitente penetretur. Dividat etiam corpora omnia: et a corporibus omnibus divid
45 Ibid.: ‘Non est [spacium] enim eis [corporibus] simile, non est eis contrarium. Neque en
sese indit. Atque illis sua puncta, suas lineas, suas superficies, impertit et profunditates, ses
Atque ita evenit, ut dum qua plenum est, omnia penetrat, et ab omnibus penetretur, omn
omnibus terminetur’.that place-space is full of body is only accidental and does not belong
to its essence, which is being empty or a vacuum.While the spaces of
bodies are accidental with regard to the nature of place-space, and
their essential properties consist of resistance, the essence of
place-space belongs to vacuum.42 Here, so it seems, we already have
an essential hierarchy or distinction between the spaces of bodies
and place-space. This was probably true in an Aristotelian frame-
work, and since Patrizi just used the terms ‘accidental’ and ‘essen-
tial’, one can be misled. Things are even more confusing if we
remember that space itself, according to Patrizi (following Proclus)
is body.43 Our philosopher should clarify the relations between emp-
tiness/fullness, and non-resistance/resistance, in regard to different
kinds of bodies-spaces.
According to Patrizi, due to the fact that half of the mundane
space and the whole of the outside space are empty, space can
contain bodies without any resistance, it divides all bodies and
is divided by them, and it cannot damage or be damaged by
any body.44 In determining the relation between space and bodies
Patrizi again shows his conceptual flexibility, suggesting a com-
pletely different framework from the Aristotelian one. Thus, space
is not similar to bodies, but it is also not contrasted to, or opposed
by, bodies. It cannot resist them, it applies itself to them. Space
shares with the bodies its points, lines, surfaces, and depths, and
it is by no means deprived of them, but rather both space and
bodies contain and hold each other, penetrate, grasp and deter-
mine each other.45 Patrizi ends this description with a series of
rhetorical questions which reveal his dialectical method and some
potential sources:
Since indeed [space] would both produce and support all these
things [bodies], and it would offer [itself] to all bodies, so that
they would exist, act, [and] endure, why should it not be called
the principle [or the beginning] of every essence, act, and
enduring of bodies? And since [space] would enclose all bodies,
why would it not likewise be regarded as the boundary [or end]
of bodies? And hence, [why should space] not in like manner be
declared to be both the origin and the end of things? And since
[space] would be both finite and infinite, why should it not bessario replebit, locumque in eo sibi efficiet’. Patrizi here is of course taking part in the
ssibility of moving the world. See, e.g., Cicero, De natura deorum, I, 13, 33; Augustine,
us amplectitur, veterum alii finitum esse dixerunt, infinitum alii. Sunt etiam qui rerum
tionemque dicti sui optimam attulit. Interrogatus quid nam maximum esset, locus,
quam respondit, si pro loco hoc maximo, inane extra mundum spacium intellexit.
mundi resolutionem in ignem. Stoici vero alii infinitum esse affirmarunt; sed quibus
s & Kranz (1969), Vol. 1, p. 71; Edelstein & Kidd (1972), Frag. 84 and 97a–b.
undum, et finitum esse, et infinitum. Finitum quidem ea parte, qua mundi extimam
vero digreditur a mundo, ab eoque procul abit, in infinitum transit’.
ubi mundum tangit, vel mentis nostrae conceptione terminatur. Sed hic terminus
mundi corpore; alterum vero [spacium inane], sit corpore omni vacuum. In eo etiam,
dens est; a corporibus nimirum plenitudo illi accedit, quae ab eo natura sunt diversa;
ro eorum, in antitypia illa, et renitentia consistit. Quare si plenum esse, spacio huic
a is not very common in Latin, thus it can indicate Patrizi’s potential source used here
e who regarded place as a body. Since we do not have Proclus’ own detailed account of
al path, his whole reconstruction of the argumentation and justification of this view
ntific context of sixteenth-century Italy. And see n. 4 above.
lud extra mundanum est inane. Quae res etiamsi ita sit, attamen magnam vim, erga se
te nullo penetret. Et contra, in tantum viribus caret, ut a corporibus omnibus, nihil eo
atur. Nullum corpus laedat, a nullo corpore laedatur’.
im eis repugnat, neque ab eis repugnatur, et dum illis resistere nequit, omnibus tamen
eque his neutiquam privans, illis largitur, ut illa sibi habeant, quae sibi retinet ipsum.
ia item compraehendat, et ab omnibus compraehendatur, et dum omnia terminat, ab
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matters, many of which things the most distinguished among
the ancients said, or probably wanted to say.46
The word principium which I translated as principle, beginning,
and origin, seems like a combination of the Stoic
(which is usually translated by Calcidius and Seneca as principale,
and by Cicero as principatum) and the Neoplatonic , although
the materiality of the Stoic notion is more relevant to Patrizi’s dis-
cussion of space, which is in any case, with regard to the ancient
sources, quite original.47 Patrizi’s last remark shows that he was
aware of its provenance: not being able to mention specific author-
ities, he just refers to the intention of some most distinguished
ancients.
With regard to the relation between corporeal qualities and
bodies, Patrizi argues that these qualities are definitely inferior to
bodies, and should be regarded as accidents, while bodies are sub-
stances.48 But places are superior to bodies, since otherwise, Patrizi
contends, bodies would not be in a place, which is impossible
according to all the philosophers.49 In summing up the relations be-
tween corporeal qualities, bodies, places, and empty space, Patrizi
stresses the superiority of place to qualities and bodies both in nat-
ure and in time. By its nature, place, before becoming a place, that is
becoming full of bodies, was part of the empty space. This means
that the empty space precedes the place by nature. And here again
the ontological and the epistemological level are combined: empti-
ness or vacuum (the special property of space) precedes both in nat-
ure (natura) and in thought (cogitatione) the state of being full (the
special property of place).50
It is only at this point that Patrizi fully presents his cosmos of
four entities. There are no other entities in nature besides space,
place, body, and quality, he contends, determining again the hier-
archy between them, from the lowest (quality) to the highest46 Ibid.: ‘Cum vero haec omnia, et faciat, et patiatur, et corporibus omnibus largiatur, ut
dicatur esse principium? Et cum corpora omnia finiat, cur corporum etiam finis non exist
finitum, et infinitum sit, cur, et principium, et finis, finita, et infinita non dicentur? Quoru
47 For the Stoic notion of see Arnim (1964), Vol. 4, p. 65. Compare Ci
somniorum veferrumus habetur interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum
nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse
esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum qui in mente et ration
fatalem umbram et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum quem ante dix
solum lunam sidera universitatemque rerum qua omnia continerentur, atque etiam homin
quod Graeci vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse pra
optumum omniumque rerum potestate dominaturque dignissimum. videmus autem in par
atque rationem. in ea parte igitur, in qua mundi inest principatus, haec inesse necesse
naturamque eam quae res omnes conplexa teneat perfectione rationis excellere, eoque de
48 Patrizi (1591), fol. 64v: ‘Corporeas qualitates, quas per corpora diximus protendi, corpor
et quotcunque sint, accidentia; corpora vero substantiae sunt, substantias autem accidentib
priora’.
49 Ibid.: ‘Corporibus vero priores sunt loci. Nam si locus, prior corpore non esset, tunc co
50 Ibid., fols. 64v–65r: ‘locus ergo vere, corporibus, corporeisque, natura et tempotre est p
quam locus sit spacij totius pars est, spacij haec pars ante locum est. Et quia pars et totum
vacuum idem sunt, et vacuum natura et cogitatione plenum praecedat, locus autem quaten
proprium est, ut vacuum sit, spacium ergo natura, et tempore prius loco est’.
51 Ibid., fol. 65r: ‘At cum entia nulla alia in natura sint praeter haec quatuor, spacium, locu
spacium nimirum rerum omnium primum est. Mundus itidem prior omnibus quae in eo su
nimirum, mundanorum omnium primum erit’.
52 Ibid.: ‘Nam si mundus prorsus corrumpatur, atque in nihilum redigatur, quod veterum n
remanebit. At si iterum, coelos novos, terramque novam, Deus reficiat, quod sapientum mu
possit coelos, terramque novam’.
53 Ibid.: ‘Ante quam hic quem incolimus mundus a Deo esset fabrefactus inane erat, in quo
voluebatur. Spacium ergo ibi erat ante mundi formationem. Est ergo spacium sui natura mu
omnia fuere’. Notice another rare Latin word, fabrefactus, which stands for the Greek
et malorum, 1, 6, 17–21; see 17–18: ‘Principio, inquam, in physicis, quibus maxime gloria
corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur. ille atomos quas appellat, id est corpora
infimum nec medium nec ultimum nec extremum sit, ita ferri, ut concursionibus inter se co
atomorum nullo a principio, sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire. Epicurus autem, in
probo, tum illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum, quae ma
materia disseruerunt, vim et causam efficiendi reliquerunt’.(space), and yet mentioning another term, the world, a general
term which contains places, bodies, and qualities, but is obviously
inferior to space, which is the first entity among everything which
is in the universe.51 It is important to stress again the connection
made by Patrizi between space and being: nothing can exist without
being somewhere, and being somewhere means for Patrizi being in a
place-space. This is essential since it enables our philosopher now to
move from the discussion of different spaces (empty space, place-
space, body-space) to the discussion of different entities (entia) in
the cosmic hierarchy. And as we shall see, these entities or sub-
stances should not be understood in an Aristotelian framework: Pat-
rizi rejects both Aristotelian physics and Aristotelian logic.
In order to show the preexistence of space to world Patrizi uses
again the Stoic doctrine of cosmic conflagration: the assumption
underlying this idea is, according to Patrizi, the preexistence of
an empty space in which the world, while existing, is placed; this
space, as long as it is the place of the world, is of course a place-
space, but it immediately becomes an empty space in the case of
a total destruction of the world. And this empty space is the basis
of, or the physical pre-condition for, or the starting point of, a new
creation of the world by God. In other words Patrizi is presenting
here space’s active role in the process of creation. The only author-
ities mentioned here by Patrizi are many wise men who were in-
spired by a divine spirit.52 This means, he continues, that God
created this empty space before creating the world we inhabit. In
his description of what was going on in this empty space before
the creation of the world, Patrizi leaves the Stoics and uses some typ-
ical Epicurean concepts.53
Nowwe can come back to the essential question: what is space?
Patrizi is of course dealing with different aspects of this question
since the beginning of the book, and loyal to his dialectical method
he will now try to present better answers, taking into account the
conclusions of his previous discussions.sint, ut agant, ut patiantur, cur omnis corporum essentiae, actionis, ac passionis non
imetur? Atque hinc, et principium rerum, et finis itidem esse non asseratur? Et cum
m pleraque praestantissimi veterum dixere, vel forte dicere voluere’.
cero’s descriptions in De natura deorum, I, 39: ‘Iam vero Chrisippus, qui Stoicorum
, atque ita ignotorum ut eos ne coniectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens
positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit
e versetur, communemque rerum naturam universam atque omnia continentem, tum
i aethera, tum ea quae natura fluerent atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aera,
es eos qui inmortalitatem essent consecuti’; and II, 29–30: ‘principatum autem id dico
estantius. ita necesse est illud etiam in quo sit totius naturae principatus esse omnium
tibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundo quod non pars universi sit) inesse sensum
t, et acriora quidem atque maiora. quocirca sapientem esse mundum necesse est,
um esse mundum omnemque vim mundi natura divina contineri’.
ibus ipsis esse posteriores, nemini dubium videri debet. Sunt enim ipsae, quaecunque,
us priores esse, nemini dubium itidem esse potest. Corpora ergo qualitatibus suis sunt
rpora non essent in loco, quod impossibile esse philosophis omnibus est confessum’.
rior. At si locus non nisi quatenus corpus locat, locus dicitur, sui autem natura, ante
natura simul sunt, spacium etiam universum ante locum est natura. Si item locus et
us locus est, plenum est? vacuum certe ante locum, et prius loco debet esse. At spacij
s, corpus, qualitas; corpus autem qualitate prius est; et corpore locus, et loco spacium,
nt locis, corporibus, qualitatibus est. Spacium autem ante quam mundus est: spacium
on ignobiles fore tradidere, spacium in quo nunc mundus ut in loco est, inane prorsus
lti, et divino viri afflati spiritu pronunciarunt, spacium praeexistit, quod novos capere
vel atomi volitabant, vel chaos volutabatur, vel materia informis, motibus inordinatis
ndo prius, primumque rerum omniummundanarum; ante quod nihil fuit, et post quod
. For some of these Epicurean concepts see, e.g., Cicero, De finibus bonorum
tur, primum totus est alienus. Democritea dicit perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae
individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito inani, in quo nihil nec summum nec
haerescant, ex quo efficiantur ea, quae sint quaeque cernantur, omnia, eumque motum
quibus sequitur Democritum, non fere labitur. quamquam utriusque cum multa non
teria sit, ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum, quae vis est, quae quidque efficiat, de
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aptitude for holding or sustaining all the bodies.54 But if it would
be part of the physical reality of the world it should be either a sub-
stance or an accidental thing. And if it is a substance it should be
either incorporeal or else a body. If it is accidental then it should
be either quantity, or quality, or anything else of this kind.55 Patrizi
is playing here with the Aristotelian distinctions that all of his read-
ers are familiar with. But then he continues:
We say indeed that space in itself, since it precedes the world
and is beyond the world, is none of the worldly matters except
of that part of it which holds the world, or that the world occu-
pies [that part] with its body. But in truth [space] is a different
thing from the world [and] a diverse one.56
So, Patrizi is directly rejecting here the Aristotelian categories and
he regards them as totally irrelevant for the discussion of space:
space is superior to the world and to everything which is included
in it (and which is subjected to the Aristotelian categories) in any
possible way. What then is space and what is the difference be-
tween space and world, if we remember Patrizi’s earlier statement,
that space is body?
Indeed the world is a body, but space is in no way a [natural]
body, therefore none of the categories embraces space: it exists
before and beyond all these [categories]. Therefore what is it? It
is a hypostasis, a distance, a separation; it is an extension, a
stretching out, an interval, it is an interruption and a pause.
Therefore quantity? Therefore accident? Therefore accident
before substance? And before body?57
Aristotelian categories simply do not work when we discuss the
notion of space. Patrizi does not contradict himself while claiming
here that space is not a body, since he means that it is not a sublu-
nar worldly body in the Aristotelian sense. Previously (n. 16 and
context) we had a similar, but not identical, set of terms: dimensio,
distantia, intervallum, intercapedo, spacium, diastasis, diastema. It is
important to notice how Patrizi tacitly brings in here the terms
hypostasis, ectasis, and extensio, thus preparing the ground for his
next dialectical move in determining what space is. What we have
here can be regarded as terminological rhetoric: Patrizi is placing
in front of his readers a whole set of terms, some of which are
not very common in Latin,58 and contrasts them with the Aristote-
lian categories. In this way he is in fact trying to create a new scien-
tific discourse, not Aristotelian in nature, and quite original, in which
the notion of space is at the centre.54 Ibid., fol. 65r: ‘Spacium ergo hoc, quod ante mundum fuit, et post quod mundus est,
capienda tantum corpora est, et aliud nihil? Suscipit quidem spacium hoc corpora omnia, se
not very common in medieval texts either. I prefer to translate it as ‘aptitude’ rather than as
‘potency’ see Deitz (1999), p. 150.
55 Ibid., fol. 65r: ‘Sane, si quicquam rerum sit, vel substantia est vel accidens. Et si substant
vel aliud tale’.
56 Ibid.: ‘Profecto dicimus nos, spacium per se ipsum, cum mundum praecedat, cumqu
mundum capit, aut quod mundus suo corpore occupat. Verum alia res a mundo diversa e
57 Ibid.: ‘Mundus enim corpus est, spacium vero corpus minime est, nulla ergo categoria
Hypostasis, diastema est, diastasis; ectasis est, extensio est, intervallum est, capedo est, at
ante corpus?’. This view of Patrizi was mentioned by Sorabji as possibly influenced by Simp
p. 165 n. 58.
58 Thus, for instance, running out of synonymous terms for space, but trying to present as
not very common; while we can find the Greek term in Latin, the term
general, these terms are quite technical, and some of them are not classical, facts which a
59 Patrizi (1591), fol. 65r: ‘Architas uterque, et senior Pythagorae auditor, et iunior Platon
For Archytas see Plato, 350a6 ff., and Diels & Kranz (1969), Vol. 1, no. 47. See also Kirk e
Discussiones peripateticae, see Deitz (2007), pp. 117–121.
60 Patrizi (1591), fol. 65r: ‘Sed sunt categoriae in mundanis bene positae, spacium de mun
sive non corpus, sive substantia, sive accidens, omnia haec antecedit; omnia illi uti accedunt
etiam quae ibi est substantia, illi sunt accidentia. Itaque aliter de eo philosophandum, qua
61 Ibid.: ‘Spacium ergo extensio est hypostatica, per se substans, nulli inhaerens. Non est
origo’.And what about authorities? At least some of the readers will be
expecting some alternative names to go along with the alternative
terminology. The only name mentioned in this context is Archytas
(early fourth century BC), a Pythagorean from Tarentum who was a
friend of Plato, and some followers of Aristotle, but Patrizi stresses
the fact that, since they did not know about this notion of space,
they still followed the Aristotelian categories.59 Now the ground
is ready for another attack on Aristotle’s categories, through which
Patrizi will present two more answers to the question what space
is, beyond aptitude.
Emphasizing the fact that the Aristotelian categories are clearly
posited in worldly matters, and thus essentially connected to the
world and its contents (bodies and qualities), while space is essen-
tially different from all these worldly matters, and thus ontologi-
cally and epistemologically separated from the world, Patrizi
concludes that space stands before and beyond the Aristotelian no-
tions of body, non-body, substance, and accident, notions upon
which the categories are based; in fact, all these notions should
be regarded only as accidental with regard to space. In other
words, Patrizi is presenting here another distinction, between
one substance which is space, and many accidents, which include
everything which is not space. This requires a different way of phi-
losophizing regarding space, without using the categories.60 And
here Patrizi offers his second answer:
Therefore, space is a hypostatic extension which stands on its
own [and] adheres to nothing. It is not quantity. And if it is
quantity, it is not that of the categories, but rather [a quantity
which stands] before that of the categories, and it is its source
and origin.61
It is now clear why Patrizi added to the list of terms we have
just seen hypostasis and extensio; he already thought of his second
answer: space as extensio hypostatica. This phrase is another exam-
ple of Patrizi’s originality, this time obviously inspired by the Neo-
platonic literature in which terms like and
are most common. Extensio may have reminded
some readers of the Aristotelian category of quantity, and Patrizi
immediately rejects this possibility. What about the Aristotelian
substance? In order to avoid any identification of extensio
hypostatica with an Aristotelian quantitas substantiva or substantia
quantitiva (since is also translated as substantia),
Patrizi sharply distinguishes between space as substance, and the
substance of the Aristotelian categories, using powerful rhetoric,
in which he repeats the formulation ‘if substance is X then spaceet quod mundum et capit, et excedit, quidnam tandem est? Aptitudone simplex ad
d non videtur, aliud nihil esse, quam aptitudo’. Notice that aptitudo is not classical, and
‘potency’ since Patrizi is ideologically avoiding any Aristotelian flavour. For aptitudo as
ia est, vel incorporeum quid est, vel corpus. Si vero accidens, vel quantitas, vel qualitas,
e extra mundum sit, nihil rerum esse mundanarum, praeter eam eius partem, quae
st’.
rum, spacium complectitur, ante eas omnes est, extra eas omnes est. Quid ergo est?
que intercapedo. Ergo quantitas? Ergo accidens? Ergo accidens ante substantiam? Et
licius or Philoponus. See Sorabji (1987), pp. 23–24. But see the remark in Deitz (1999),
many as possible for rhetorical reasons, Patrizi used capedo (for intercapedo) which is
is a Greek term which only the Greek readers of Patrizi will be familiar with. In
gain will make it harder for the readers to follow Patrizi’s arguments.
is amicus, et qui eos secuti sunt scriptores categoriarum, hoc spacium non cognovere’.
t al. (1957), pp. 216, 223, 225, 335. On the problem of the two Archytas in Patrizi’s
danis non est; aliud quam mundus est. Nulli mundanae rei accidit, sive ea corpus sit,
, sic etiam accidunt; ita ut non solum quae in categoriis numerantur accidentia, verum
m ex categoriis’.
quantitas. Et si quantitas est, non est illa categoriarum, sed ante eam, eiusque fons et
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represents once again Patrizi’s effort to create a new scientific ter-
minology in which spacium as extensio hypostatica should replace
the Aristotelian notion of substantia. And thus, space as a substance
stands by itself, it is the most substance in comparison to all other
things, it does not lean upon anything for its existence. It offers
substantiality to substances and supports them so that they would
exist, and it is present in all other things in nature. Space as sub-
stance conducts everything else and causes its existence while
not being conducted by anything, and if substance is the first
among all beings, then space is the most substance among all
beings.62 Patrizi still wants to be sure that his readers would not
confuse space and Aristotelian substance before presenting his third
answer to the question what space is:
Therefore, from all these arguments it is most evident that
space is the most substance among all things, but it is not that
substance of the categories, since it is not an individual sub-
stance, since it is not composed of matter and form. And it is
not a genus, since it is not predicated either of species or of par-
ticulars, but rather, it is some other substance which is beyond
the one of the categories.63
While determining whether this special substance is corporeal or
incorporeal, Patrizi reaches his third definition of space, again pre-
senting the same conceptual flexibility:
Would [this substance] then be a body or is it an incorporeal
substance? [It is] neither, but rather [this substance would be]
in the midst of these two possibilities. It is not a body, since it
is not resisting, nor is it opposing or struggling against [other
bodies]; it is not exposed or subjected to either sight or touch,
nor to any of the senses. And again, it is not incorporeal, since62 Ibid.: ‘Quid ergo substantiane est? Si substantia est, id quod per se substat, spacium m
quo sustineatur, sed ipsum, substantiis sustentationem praebet, easque ut sint sustentat.
maxime omnium per se existit. Si substantia est, quae aliis substat, spacium maxime omn
nulla aliarum rerum eget ad esse, spacium omnium maxime substantia est, nullo enim ali
entium est, spacium maxime omnium substantia est. Primum enim aliarum rerum omniu
63 Ibid.: ‘Hisce ergo rationibus omnibus patuit clarissime, spacium maxime omnium subs
est, quia non est ex materia, et forma composita. Neque est genus, neque enim de speciebus
64 Ibid.: ‘Quid igitur corpusne est, an incorporea substantia? Neutrum, sed medium utrius
tactui, sensuum nulli obiicitur, aut subiicitur. Incorporeum rursus non est, quia trine dime
habet, sed cunctas. Itaque corpus incorporeum est, et non corpus corporeum’. As shown in D
Corollarium de loco. See Diels (1882), p. 612.
65 Compare, e.g., Barozzi’s Latin translation of Proclus’ commentary on Euclid, in Barozzi (1
intimas vero desinit rationes, et excitatur quidem a posterioribus, pervenit autem in praeci
motu locali, neque alterante, quemadmodum sensus, sed vitali convoluitur, et incorporeum
perficiuntur progrediens, interdum vero retrosum cedens: et interdum quidem ab iis, qua
posita sunt ad ea, quae cognitione praecedunt’. For the
commentary see, e.g., 20.26 ( ), 21.22 (
137.17 ( ). On 54.1–5 we have a nice example for the kind of N
’.
66 Patrizi (1591), fol. 65r–v: ‘Quod enim movetur, per hoc spacium movetur; hoc autem spa
etiam, vel in ipso, vel extra ipsum terminus ullus est unde moveatur, aut quo moveatur. N
spacij partes, altera esset in altera, et supra alteram, et locus illius quae discederet, spacio v
movetur. Est ergo et immotum prorsus, et omnino immobile’.
67 Ibid., fol. 65v: ‘Partes quidem habet duas, ac totum dici nequit. Pars altera spacij ea est,
his partibus conflatum, dici minime potest. Nam totum omne, partibus constat, omnibus fi
mundo finibus finitum, et equale est. Parte autem mundo vacua, extra mundum posita, fi
68 Ibid.: ‘Rationabile videtur, infinitum parttem maiores [vires] habere, quoniam aequas h
pars, maiores habere dicatur’.
69 Ibid.: ‘Si ea [pars] vires habet ullas, eas vel in sese exercet, vel in partem finitam, vel in m
aget in aliam eius partem, quae vel easdem vires habebit, vel maiores, vel minores, vel et
aget? Multo minus possibile videtur, si patiens pars, maioribus sit viribus. Haec enim potiu
praedita, poterit a maioribus forsitan pati aliquid’.
70 Ibid.: ‘Sed quisnam inaequalitatem hanc virium, rei tribuit prorsus sibi simili? Et alter
spacium illud acquisivisse. Ergo ab alio’.
71 Ibid.: ‘A chaos forte illo, vel materia informi, vel atomis, quae per illud spacium vol
formatus? Recipiebat quidem et illa, recipit et hunc. Receptio haec, actione est, an passio
actione, vel a passione solita est provenire. Utraque autem, quia recipere, est agere, ubi auteit includes three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, not
one, not two, or more [i.e. than three], but rather all [three].
And thus it is an incorporeal body, and a corporeal non-body.64
Patrizi is here rejecting the distinction between corporeal and
incorporeal substances. Space stands beyond this distinction. The
third definition of space we have here is again inspired by Neopla-
tonic dialectic and rhetoric.65
Moving on to discuss the qualities of space (both empty space
and place-space), Patrizi contends that space, while being the
source of movement for anything that moves, is essentially
immovable and empty.66 In determining the relations between the
two parts of space, Patrizi argues that space cannot be considered
as a whole since it has two different parts: one is full of the world
and the other is empty and it is outside the world; one is finite,
and the other, as we have seen, is both finite and infinite.67 But what
about the powers of each part? It seems reasonable that the part
which is both finite and infinite should have greater powers, since
infinity is superior to finitude.68 It is also reasonable that in that part
of space which acts upon another part, which is passive and receiv-
ing this activity, there are greater powers.69 This creates an unequal
state between different parts of space, and the question then will be
from where does this unequal state of powers comes from.70 While
dealing with the question from where space received these powers,
either from the chaotic state before the formation of the world, from
unformed matter or from the atoms, or rather from the world after it
was formed, Patrizi is focusing on the nature of the act of receiving
(receptio), and whether it is an activity or a receptivity. Showing
again his conceptual flexibility, Patrizi explains how receptio is at
once both activity (actio) and receptivity (passio) and yet neither of
these two.71 Receptio is thus the first power of space, but is it the
only one? Apparently not. Patrizi immediately adds to it an internal
power of placing (locandi) and an external power of surroundingaxime omnium substantia est. Substat enim per se, nulli innititur ut sit; nullius eget,
Si substantia est, quod per se existit, spacium omnium maxime substantia est; quia
ium substantia est; omnibus enim substat aliis naturae rebus. Si substantia est, quae
orum eget, ut sit; reliqua omnia, ut sint, egent spacio. Si substantia, primum omnium
m esse iam est probatum’.
tantiam esse, sed non est categoriae substantia illa. Neque enim individua substantia
, neque de singularibus praedicatur. Sed alia quaedam extra categoriam substantia est’.
que. Corpus non est, quia non est antitypos, aut resistens, aut renitens, non visui, non
titur. Longitudinem, latitudinem profunditatemque, non unam, non duas, aut plures
eitz (1999), p. 155, and p. 168 n. 84, the formula appears in Simplicius’
560), pp. 10–11: ‘At Mathematica extrinsecus a recordatione quidem sumit initium, in
puam formarum essentiam. nec immobilis quidem eius est actio, sicut intelligens, nec
rationum percurrit ornatum, interdum quidem a principiis ad ea, quae principiis ipsis
e praecognoscuntur ad ea, quae quaeruntur, interdum vero ab iis, quae in quaestione
see Proclus (1873), 18.24; for other uses of forms in this
), 49.10 ( ), 49.26 ( ),
eoplatonic dialectic which inspired Patrizi: ‘
cium supra se non movetur, neque aliud usquam est supra quod moveri queat. Neque
eque pars eius ulla, hinc illuc migrat: per partem namque sui ipsius migraret. Et duae
acuus remaneret, atque ita spacium seipso vacuum esset. Itaque nec toto, nec partibus
quae mundo plena est. Altera quae mundo est vacua, extra mundum est. At totum ex
nitis, quibus et ipsum finitum esse necessarium est. At spacium, parte mundo plena,
nitum infinitumque, uti docuimus, est simul’.
abere finitum et infinitum, non est rationi consonum. Multo minus, si finita, et minor
undum ipsum, eiusque partes. Si in sese eas exercet, alia eius pars, iis viribus praedita,
iam nullas? Si easdem, quomodo ab aequis viribus patietur? Aut quomodo in aequas
s aget in minores, quam ab his patiatur quicquam. Si vero minoribus sit patiens pars
am ab altera dissimilem fecit? Non videtur a se ipso, hanc partium dissimilitudinem,
itabant, ac volutabantur antequam mundus formaretur, vel a mundo, postquam est
? Utraque videtur, et neutra. Neutra quidem, quia nulla ibi fuit alteratio, quae vel ab
m actio, ibi et passio videtur esse necessario. Has ergo recipiendi vires habere videtur’.
252 A. Edelheit / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (2009) 243–257(ambiendi). These two powers act upon the world and thus they
belong to the infinite part of the empty space.72 And what about
the powers of the finite space in the world? It also has these three
powers of receiving, placing, and surrounding, but it has other three:
the power of penetrating (penetrandi) into all bodies; the power of
uniting (uniendi) itself with the particular spaces of bodies; and
the power of providing (dandi) these powers with a place in the
movements of bodies.73 And here we finally have one authority
mentioned: Hermes, the wisest among the Egyptians, who claimed
that the movement in the world can be caused only by something
immovable, and the only things immovable in the world are space
and earth.74 Obviously, this reference relates Patrizi to the Florentine
humanism of the last decades of the fifteenth century and especially
to Marsilio Ficino, for whom the figure of Hermes Trismegistus be-
came part of the ancient theologians (prisci theologi) and the ancient
theology (prisca theologia).75
Patrizi is describing a new physics in which everything in the
world ismovingdue to space: the animals aboveandbelowtheearth,
but also the principal bodies of the world, which hold the power of
movement due to the fact that they are placed in a place and they
are not separated from it. The centre of the world would be always
at the centre of space, and the earth is in the same space around the
centre and it always remainsunmoved.Alsowater, air, and thewhole
heaven belong to space.76 Thus, the bodies of the world, the heaven
and the elements, occupy from the beginning their proper parts of
space, where they are placed, and they would always maintain these
parts.77 Just as all theworldly bodies differ fromone another by nature,
so the parts of space which are subjected to the particularity of these
bodies seemtodiffer fromoneanother; but this difference amongparts
of space, Patrizi contends, since its origin are these placed bodies,
should be regarded only as accidental, unless it will be proved that
these parts of spacewere thus disposed from thebeginning, so that this
part would hold for instance the earth but not the air, and another part
wouldholdwater, but itwouldnotbeable tohold theheaven, theair, or
the earth. But in fact, any part of space held its peculiar bodies, so if this
is thecase, Patrizi argues, this peculiarity isnecessarily placed into each
one of these bodies by another superior power. And the question as to72 Ibid.: ‘Nimirum videtur vim habere, id quod recipit, et intrinsecus locandi et extrinsecu
quidem de infinito illo’.
73 Ibid.: ‘At finitum quod in mundo est, et tres illas recipiendi, locandi, ambiendique vires
uniendi. Et ad has corporum motibus locum dandi’.
74 Ibid.: ‘Oportet enim quod movetur corpus, uti sapientissimus Aegyptiorum Hermes
spacium ac terram’. For the reference to Hermes see Nock & Festugiere (1954–1960), V
Renaissance see Vasoli (2002), pp. 133–153, and see the classical study by Yates (1964).
75 On Ficino and Patrizi see Muccillo (1986). On ancient theology and perennial philoso
Biggemann (2004).
76 Patrizi (1591), fol. 65v: ‘Non autem motus omnes super hac fiunt, piscium, avium, sub
quaeque loco, atque ordine ab eoque non dimoveantur. Atque ita evenit, ut mundi centru
immobilis; et aqua suo, et aer, et coelum universum’.
77 Ibid.: ‘Quod si sic est, mundi corpora, coelum nempe et elementa, partes spacij sibi pr
78 Ibid.: ‘Quae sicuti inter se differunt natura: sic spacij partes, eorum singulis subiectae, p
per accidens illis accidit, nisi probetur spacij eas partes ita ab initio dispositas fuisse, ut qu
terram non valeret. Sed propria sibi corpora, unamquamque cepisse. Quod si concedatur, ia
cuius fuerit, et quae, suo loco perquiretur’.
79 Ibid., fol. 66r: ‘Anteriore libro, est a nobis demonstratum, spacium, actu esse infin
annectamus. Inter quae primum esto, spacium quod infinitum est, qua infinitum, nullas hab
est, aeque scilicet quaquaversum infinitum est. Cum autemmaius se ipso fieri nequeat: mun
Maximum enim id revera est, quo aliud maius esse nequit. Sin autem ipso maius nihil o
simpliciter est’.
80 Ibid.: ‘At si maximum hoc, est in rebus; in rebus etiam erit minimum. Altero namqu
Contraria opinor innotescet ratione. Nam ut maxime magnum est, ita minimum est maxime
quo minus esse nequit. Et sicut maximum est infinitum, sic minimum erit finitum’.
81 Ibid.: ‘Et ut maximum, maxime dividi potest, ita minimum minime dividi potest. Atque
est in infinitum, sic finitum, divisibile est in finitum’.
82 Ibid.: ‘Atque ita falsum, vetus illud dogma apparet, omnem quantitatem seu quan
scilicet finitum spacium, eo usque divisibile sit, ut divisio ea ad minimum spacium
‘whosepower this power is, andwhat is its nature, of anybody, and that
superior power, will be discussed later, in its place.78
Patrizi’s notion of physical space goes beyond the Aristotelian
physics and its most basic concepts. Instead of the categories, sub-
stances and accidents, we have a notion of space which is a hypo-
static extension, a minimal body, the first and only real substance
which is totally dependent upon itself, but all other beings are
dependent on it for their existence. Space exists before and beyond
the world, only due to space does the world exist and could be
created again in case of a Stoic conflagration. This new notion is
presented by Patrizi by way of a dialectical definition, using
conceptual flexibility, through which all the Aristotelian assump-
tions are left behind. Thus, for instance, vacuum characterizes space
and exists before fullness, and so, empty space comes before the
world which is full of bodies and qualities in Patrizi’s hierarchy of
entities. Patrizi explains how space can be at once finite and infinite,
a bodywithout resistancewhich is not subjected to any of the senses
but still has three dimensions, and thus, it cannot be determined
according to the dichotomy corporeal/incorporeal. Let us move
now to discuss Patrizi’s notion of the mathematical space.
Patrizi’s starting point is to note the implications of the fact that
space is both really (actu) finite and infinite. Being infinite, space
has no powers to become greater than itself, or to enlarge itself
in any part, since it is equally diffused in all parts. Space is in fact
(simpliciter) the biggest among all things.79 But that part of space
which is finite is, on the other hand, the smallest thing in reality
or in the world (in rebus).80 Patrizi immediately connects magnitude
or quantity and divisibility:
And just as thebiggest thingcanbemostlydivided, so the smallest
thing can only minimally be divided. And this should be under-
stood of each of the two parts of space; and just as that infinite
space is infinitelydivisible, so thefinitespace isfinitelydivisible.81
This connection enables Patrizi to reject ‘an ancient dogma’ accord-
ing to which any quantity can be infinitely divided, and to accept a
contrary view.82 It is in this context that Patrizi introduces his defi-
nition of a point:s undequaque ambiendi. Sicuti, et illa, et hunc mundum, et locavit, et ambivit. Et haec
obtinet, et praeterea corpora omnia penetrandi, et se se cum propriis illorum spaciis
tradidit, per immobile aliquod moveri, immobile autem in mundo nihil est, praeter
ol. 1, p. 181. For a general discussion of the magical and esoteric traditions in the
phy see, e.g., Schmitt (1966, 1970); Walker (1972); Gentile & Gilly (1999); Schmidt-
limium reliquorum. Habent vim praeterea corpora mundi principalia, ut suo locentur
m, in spacij centro semper sit, et terra semper eodem spacio circa centrum maneat
oprias a principio occuparunt, quibus locarentur, ac perpetuo obtinerent’.
ossunt videri inter se se differre; differentia haec, cum a locatis proveniat corporibus,
ae terram caperet, aerem non caperet. Et quae aquam, coelum capere aut aerem, aut
m haec proprietas, a vi alia superiore, necessario cuique illarum indita est. Sed vis haec
itum, et actu esse quoque finitum. Nunc ea, quae hasce positiones consequuntur,
et vires, ut maius fiat, aut ullam in partem sese amplificet. In omnes enim aeque fusum
do vero, aliisque cunctis maius sit, et simpliciter maximum, et maximum omnium est.
mnino est, ipsum maximum omnium est. Et si se ipso maius fieri nequit, maximum
e contrariorum posito, poni necesse est et alterum. At quidnam hoc minimum est?
parvum. Et prout maximum id est, quo maius nihil esse potest. Ita minimum illud est,
hoc utrumque de spacio est intelligendum, et sicut illud infinitum spacium, divisibile
tum dividi posse in infinitum. Et contrarium dogma esse verum est necesse, ut
perveniat’. This vetus dogma seems to be found in Aristotle’s Physics 206a9–18:
’.
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from space, that is, [it is] not space. And this thing is what the
ancient geometricians called a point, and we, too, shall call it
a point.83
A point is not a space and it has no dimension; on the other
hand, Patrizi determines that space, being contrary to point, con-
tains all dimensions. For this reason space contains all parts while
point is completely without parts, and so, it is indivisible.84 What
we have here is in fact the first two components of the mathematical
space which are its two contrasted poles: space (which is like a con-
tainer) on the one hand, and point (which is inside this container) on
the other. Between these two we shall find all the other members of
the mathematical space. Just as we have seen in the case of the phys-
ical space, Patrizi will now determine the relations and hierarchy
between these members. If point is indivisible, we should first
distinguish it from other indivisible concepts like unity (unitas), a
moment of time (momentum temporis), and a moment of movement
(momentum motus). Starting with the last two Patrizi contends that
they are posterior to point: time comes either after, or together with,
movement.85 Time and movement are the two most remote (or else
last) concepts in the mathematical space with regard to point, which,
as we shall shortly see, is the first one. Time is posterior to move-
ment, and movement comes before bodies. And before bodies we
have yet three more stages: three dimensions, two dimensions,
and one dimension. First dimension is just after point, which comes
before everything else in the mathematical space.86 Coming back to
the concept of unity, Patrizi claims that it is essentially identical to
point, only that both concepts are related to different things: while
point is related to line, unity is related to number.87 We can see here
how Patrizi adds more and more members to the mathematical
space, thus creating, on an epistemological level, a mathematical dis-
course, so far containing time, movement, bodies, three dimensions,
two dimensions, one dimension, and before everything else a point,
which is identical to unity (which is related to number), but is re-
lated to line.
While clarifying the relation between point and line Patrizi criti-
cizes the Aristotelian idea according to which point is the beginning
ororigin (principium) of line (just asunity is thebeginningororiginof
A. Edelheit / Studies in History and P83 Patrizi (1591), fol. 66r: ‘Sed aliquid in spacio minimum, et diversum a spacio sit, hoc est
et nos appellemus’.
84 Ibid.: ‘Qui sicuti non spacium est, ita nullam habet dimensionem, et ideo non habet, qu
et indivisibilis’.
85 Ibid.: ‘At qua indivisibilis est [punctus], cur non etiam erit unitas? Quae et ipsa nequ
indivisibilia. Sunt, sed puncto sunt posteriora. Tempus enim post motum, vel cum motu e
86 Ibid.: ‘Motus post corpora, et cum corporibus; corpora post dimensionem trinam. Haec
est, quia in spacio, omnium primus, positus est’.
87 Ibid.: ‘Qui itidem unitas est. Verum cum essentialiter ambo idem sint; nomina, ad aliu
88 Ibid., fol. 66r–v: ‘Est enim punctus principium lineae, sicut unitas numeri principium
productae, linea proxime a puncto erit producta. As si productionis nomen inducamus. Mot
attingit punctum. Si non motus, nec productio. Si non productio, nec principium lineae pun
producta. Nec erit linea punctus fluens quod veteres aliqui autumarunt’. On principium se
89 Ibid., fol. 66v: ‘Quid ergo linea est? Pars ea spacij quae inter duo puncta interiacet’.
90 Ibid.: ‘Cum autem duo puncta dico, iam et numerum induco. Et sunt in spacio duo pu
91 Ibid.: ‘Neque numerus ante lineam est, nec linea ante numerum. Nec iam posteros quae
natura antiquior esset, ac prior. Simul enim sunt. Neque est altera ante alteram, nec alter
92 Ibid.: ‘Ac veterum scientissimi Pythagorei recte dixere, binarium qui primus numerus es
qui tertius, respondere corpori’. See (pseudo)-Boethius (1867), pp. 397–398: ‘Primum aute
est, sed fons et origo numerorum, sub linea X inscripta ponentes XX et ternarium X
denominationes assignare constituerunt’. These ideas are ascribed to the Pythagoreans on
93 Patrizi (1591), fol. 66v: ‘Etenim sicuti, quae inter duo puncta spacij pars intercipitur, line
spacij pars continetur, (uno in eodem posito) primum corpus efficitur Pyramis. Post quod
corpus absolvent. Hoc est trinam dimensionem, longum, latum, et profundum’.
94 Ibid.: ‘Igitur, natura nos per rerum gradus, ordine ducente, in puncta, in lineas, in supe
eam, quae mathematica a veteribus est nuncupata, universam constituunt. Cumque haec om
infinita, et actu infinita esse, est necesse’.number), since such relation brings the notion of production or cre-
ation into the picture (suggesting that line is produced or created by
point), and this production involves movement, which as we have
seen, is only in the fifth stage (after bodies, three dimensions, two
dimensions, one dimension, and point). So we cannot, according to
Patrizi, relatemovementdirectly topoint. And thusweshoulddeter-
mine again the relation between point and line, leaving out of this
explanation concepts like principium, productio, andmotus.88 At this
point Patrizi introduces his definition of line:
 What then is a line? [It is] that part of space which lies between
two points.89
This definition brings the notion of number back, since two
points were mentioned. This means that there are in fact (actu)
two points in space, and thus, also a number or quantity.90 This
raises the question of which concept comes first, number or line, a
question that, according to Patrizi, should not vex later thinkers
the way it tormented the ancient ones. His answer is that none of
these concepts comes before the other, they come at the same time
and depend one upon the other.91 Patrizi agrees with the Pythagore-
ans that number one consists of two and corresponds with line; two
consists of three and corresponds with a surface; three consists of
four and corresponds with a body.92 And so, the part of space be-
tween two points is a line, between three is a triangular surface, be-
tween four is the first body, a pyramid, and then more points just
create other three dimensional bodies.93
Once again we find in Patrizi a perfect correspondence between
the structure or grades of reality and the science through which we
can understand this structure. We are thus led through the grades
of reality in nature, going from points, lines, surfaces, bodies, unity,
and numbers. Mathematics is the science connected to these con-
cepts, which being in that infinite space, are also infinite.94 Criticiz-
ing ancient thinkers for not understanding the relation between
these concepts and infinitude, Patrizi mentions four arguments by
the ancients concerning point, line, and number, and their infinite
magnitude, division, extention, and increment, and he then gives
his own account regarding these arguments, emphasizing his strongnon spacium. Atque hoc est, quod veteres Geometrae, punctum appellavere, Punctum
ia contrarium eius, spacium scilicet, omnes habet. Et quia nullas habet, impartibilis sit,
aquam dividi potest. Dixere veteres, mementum temporis, mementum motus, esse
st’.
post binam. Bina post unam. Una vero post punctum. Punctus ergo ante omnia haec
d relata, sunt sortita. Punctus relatione ad lineam, unitas relatione ad numerum’.
est [Aristotle, Topica 108b26–27]. Si vero principium quoque dicatur relatione rei
um inducemus, quem quinto gradu distare a puncto modo dixeramus. Non ergo motus
ctus erit. Quid ergo si linea a puncto non producitur, linea non erit? Erit sane, sed non
e also nn. 46 and 47 above and context.
ncta actu. Itaque numerus actu una cum continuo est’.
stio illa vexet, quae veteres male torsit: utra nam, vel continua, vel discreta quantitas,
a sine altera est, nec esse potest’.
set, lineae respondere. Ternarium qui secundus, respondere superficiei. Quaternarium
m numerum id est binarium, unitas enim, ut in arithmeticis est dictum, numerus non
XX et quaternarium XL ceterosque in ordine sese sequentes proprias secundum
p. 396.
a est, et quae inter tria, prima est superficies triangulus, sic quae inter puncta quatuor
si quinque punctis spacium comprendatur, si sex, si aliis pluribus, non aliud quam
rficies, in corpora, in unitatem, in numeros deducti sumus. Haec autem scientiarum,
nia in spacio illo infinito iacere comperta sint, idque sit actu infinitum, ea quoque ibi
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vide a line which is between two points infinitely.95
After presenting his detailed objection via different arguments
and paradoxes concerning infinite division of any line and quan-
tity, stressing the precedence of continuity and indivisibility to dis-
continuity and division, and the fact that a line is a quantity which
is not composed of points, but rather simple and without any
parts,96 Patrizi concludes that the first space is indivisible either
by any force of nature or of the human mind. But, according to its
very nature, divided body has been placed in its continuous parts.97
But, our philosopher contends, at any time it wishes, a thing can be
regarded or considered by the mind as divided. Thus, lines, surfaces,
bodies, and incorporeal things are all in fact (actu) infinite in number
and magnitude, that is in their lengths, breadths, and depths, they
are just immeasurable and endless in reality (re ipsa). But all these
things are imagined by us as finite. Our mind, out of its own neces-
sity, assumes that those things which can be accommodated to the
spaces of the worldly bodies are finite.98 And here we find Patrizi’s
account of the mathematical process and his epistemological theory,
as opposed to Aristotle’s famous view of the mathematical process as
abstraction.99 The reason for rejecting this Aristotelian theory is that
those spaces are not in themselves part of the worldly bodies, but
rather they really exist before bodies in the first space.100 These
dimensions are not created by our imagination or by our discursive
thinking. They have subsistence.101 And so
But the mind cuts off by its own force from that first space these
parts which are going to be of use to it either in thought or in
action.102
Patrizi emphasizes that, although some of these parts of space are
continuous and some are divided, the last were in fact cut off from
the first.103 He then gives his account of the act of the mind, contin-
uous space, division, and point:
And the continuous [space] is always in actuality; indeed it is
not divided by the mind neither in actuality nor in potentiality,
but it is only imagined as divided. And just as the first contin-
uum is in reality the largest, so in it, also in actuality, since it95 Ibid.: ‘Quod a veteribus non bene cognitum, non est plane negatum, nec plene traditum
posse in infinitum protrahi; numerum in infinitum posse augeri, asserverunt. De quibus qu
negamus. Tertiam, partim negamus, partim fatemur. Lineam enim negamus, a nostra ment
infinitudinem sui natura, fatemur subire. Quartum vero fatemur partim, qua scilicet numeru
fieri intelligatur. Sed secunda illa maxime est nobis controversa. Fatemur enim infinitam li
punctis terminata ac finita (sicuti veteres acceperunt, et docuerunt) id vero maxime pern
96 Ibid., fols. 66v–68r.
97 Ibid., fol. 68r: ‘Nos vero ex veritate dicamus demonstrata, spacium illud primum a nu
partibus continuis, divisa corpora collocata’.
98 Ibid.: ‘A mente vero, quandocumque libet, divisum cogitari. In eoque omni, lineas, sup
hoc est longitudines, latitudines, profunditatesque, sine ullo numero, sine ullo fine, re ipsa
opus sumere, quae spaciis mundanorum corpororum possint accommodari’.
99 Ibid.: ‘A quibus corporibus non per abstractionem, mens ea separat, ut quidam conten
100 Patrizi (1591), fol. 68r: ‘Quoniam ea spacia non sunt primo, et per se in mundanis cor
101 Ibid.: ‘Neque etiam in phantasia, aut dianoea nostra, (ut quidam alij viri admirabile
subsistentiam habent’.
102 Ibid.: ‘Sed mens e spacio illo primo vi sua, eas partes desecat, quae sibi sunt, vel cont
103 Ibid.: ‘Easque omnes, vel continuas, vel discretas. Continuum autem asserimus esse, id
104 Ibid.: ‘Et continuum semper actu est; a mente vero, nec actu, ne potentia dividi, sed d
minimum actu esse quoque, est necesse, quia sit necesse, in natura, ac rebus, utraque con
minimum continuum illud erit, quo minus esse nequit. Et sicuti maxima magnitudo, ea est
magnitudo ea erit, quae minor esse nequit. Et quae in parvitate id totum est, quod esse p
Minimam autem magnitudinem dicimus esse, minimum spacium, sive spacij minimum. I
105 Ibid.: ‘Neque mirum videri debet, eam [divisionem] sensu non comprehendi, quando n
percipit’.
106 Ibid.: ‘Patuit quoque, continuum sui natura, omni divisione antiquius ac prius esse; cu
107 Ibid.: ‘Atque hinc etiam fit manifestum cur numerus discreta quantitas a veteribus d
quantitatem a natura esse, numerum vero humanae mentis esse opus. In mundanis aute
antiquius esse discretio. Quoniam discretio nulla fieri posset a vi ulla, nisi continuum ant
108 Patrizi (1591), fol. 68r: ‘Solviturque hinc quaestio illa, apud veteres recentioresque ardu
non ex rei natura, Geometriam appellavere; an discretorum, quam Arithmeticam dixere. His necessary that the smallest [entity] exists, it would be neces-
sary that each of these two contraries exist in nature and in
things. And just as the biggest continuous [space] is a thing,
of which nothing can be bigger, so the smallest continuous
[space] will be that thing of which nothing can be smaller.
And just as the biggest magnitude is that of which nothing
can be bigger, and it is the whole and total which can exist, so
also the smallest magnitude will be that of which nothing can
be smaller. And that is total in its smallness as much as possible.
And still this thing is not [as small as the] point which we
described above as the smallest [entity] in space. But we said
that [point is] the smallest magnitude, the smallest space, or
the smallest [member] of space. In this [account], that division
of the continuous [space] which was considered infinite, should
necessarily stop.104
The concept of mathematical space is beyond the comprehension of
our mind, and its division (either finite or infinite) is completely
imagined by the mind. This first space or any of its members cannot
be grasped by sense perception, claims Patrizi.105
It is clear, then, that this continuous space, by its very nature, is
more ancient and previous to any division, done by the power of
human cognition which produced number.106 This leads Patrizi to
his account of number, in which he accepts the ancient Aristotelian
view of number as divided quantity (discreta quantitas), but criticizes
ancient thinkers for guessing more than understanding this issue.
According to our philosopher there is continuous quantity in nature,
while number is the creation of the human mind, and so, continuity
is totally superior and previous to division, which is dependent upon
the existence of continuity which can then be divided.107 Solving
what is presented as a difficult question for both ancient and con-
temporary thinkers, Patrizi contends that the knowledge or science
of continuous things, which originated from the measurements of
territories or lands (ab agrorum dimensionibus) and not from the nat-
ure of a thing (ex rei natura), and is thus called geometry (geo-me-
try), comes before the knowledge or science of divided things,
which is called arithmetic.108 Arithmetic, he says, has now been
shown to have originated in geometry and to be inferior to it. Relat-
ing once again ontology to epistemology Patrizi argues that since. Puncta enim infinita in magnitudine esse; lineam posse in infinitum dividi; lineam
atuor asserrionibus, primam neque fatemur, neque negamus. Secundam et fatemur, et
e, aut arte in infinitum posse produci; attamen eam quae punctis finita est, iis liberata
s sui natura infinitatem subit, negamus vero partim, qua scilicet nostra opera, id posse
neam, quae punctis libera, infinitudinem subijt, in infinitum posse dividi. Sed in linea
egamus’.
lla naturae, a nulla humanae mentis vi divisum esse. Fuisse tamen a natura, in eius
erficies, corpora, incorporea illa scilicet, et numero, et magnitudine actu infinita esse,
esse. Haec tamen cuncta, a nobis finita imaginari. Mentemque nostram finita sibi in
derunt’. See Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 81a38–b9; De anima 431b12–19.
poribus. Sed sunt ante corpora, actu in primo spacio’.
s tradiderunt) veluti in subiecto, dimensiones illae et quae inde formantur reliqua,
emplationi, vel operi, usui futura’.
quod extenditur. Discretum vero, quod de continuo desecatur’.
ivisum imaginari tantum. Et sicuti continuum primum, actu maximum est, sic in eo,
traria existere. Et sicuti maximum continuum est id, quo maius esse non potest, ita
nec maior esse potest, et id omne ac totum est, quod esse potest. Ita quoque minima
otest. Neque tamen id, est punctus, quem supra dicebamus esse, minimum in spacio.
n quo sistetur necessario illa continui divisio credita in infinitum’.
ec totum ipsum spacium primum, nec eius partem ullam parvam, magnamve sensus
ius divisio, ac desectio, humane cogitationis vi facta, numerum procreasse’.
ivinantibus potius quam causam scientibus sit appellatus. Patet quoque continuam
m corporibus inter se divisis, esse etiam a natura. Clarum quoque evasit, continuum
ecederet’. For number as divided quantity see Aristotle, Categoriae, 4b22–23.
a: utra prior esset natura, continuorum ne scientia, quam ab agrorum dimensionibus
anc scilicet diximus ex illa nasci, atque ideo secundam esse’.
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etry (the science of the continuous) and arithmetic (the science of
the divided) exist before matter.109 And what about the status of
mathematics in a more general perspective?
And mathematics is in the middle, between the entirely incor-
poreal and the entirely corporeal, not because of the reason
given by the ancients, according to which [mathematics]
through abstraction from natural things almost becomes corpo-
real, but rather since in fact space is body incorporeal and incor-
poreal body. Thus it happens that through its body [space] holds
relationship with things and bodies in nature, in what concerns
their dimensions. But to its incorporeal aspect, inasmuch as it is
truly and plainly incorporeal. And it would be closer to that
[incorporeal aspect] than to any body in nature. By this same
progression of arguments it would be clear to some one who
is engaged in the contemplation of things in nature that the sci-
ence of space should both be regarded and transmitted as supe-
rior to either natural [science] or to that [science] which deals
with actions and passions of human beings. For also these
[actions and passions] are posterior to operations in nature,
and these same operations are in the same way posterior to
space.110
Mathematics is thus superior to both ethics and natural science,
since its object, space, is superior to nature and to human concerns.
Patrizi is criticizing here Aristotle’s notion of the mathematical
process, and mathematics as , as it appears for instance in
Metaphysics 1059b6–16. Aristotle put mathematics between
and and thus left it in a rather inferior status.
We can find a similar emphasis on mathematics being in the mid-
dle, but between indivisible and simple substances, and divisible
ones, that is, in essentially higher status than that we have found
in Aristotle, in the opening lines of Proclus’ first prologue to his
commentary on Euclid. Let us examine Barozzi’s translation of this
opening section:
It is necessary that the essence of mathematics would neither
be located among the first, that is the genera, nor among the
last, that is those things which are separated from simple
essence, but rather it occupies a place in the middle, between
indivisible, simple, and not compounded substances on the109 Ibid.: ‘Cumque spacium sit rerum naturae omnium primum, eius Scientiam utramque, et
110 Ibid.: ‘Media quoque est [mathematica], inter incorporeum omnino, et corporeum omnino,
quasi fieri, sed quia revera spacium sit corpus incorporeum et incorporeum corpus. Unde fit ut
dimensiones. Incorporeo autem suo, incorporeum quod vere et simpliciter est, quadam tenus
progressione fit manifestum, naturae rerum contemplationem ingredienti, spacij scientiam pri
actiones, passionesque compraehendit. Nam et hae, naturae operibus posteriores sunt; et hae
111 Barozzi (1560), p. 1: ‘Mathematicam essentiam neque ex primis eorum, quae sunt generibu
obtinere locum inter impartibiles, et simplices, et incompositas, et indivisibiles substantia
terminatas. Quod enim in rationibus, quae in ipsa versantur eodem semper modo se habet
superiorem esse declarat. Progrediendi vero vis illa, quae apprehendit, et que rerum subiectaru
ipsi dat ordinem, eo ordine, quem sortita est impartibilis, et in se ipsa pe
‘
‘
112 Barozzi (1560), p. 2: ‘Mathematica autem, et omnino quaecunque sub cogitationem cad
vincant, sensilibus vero, cum materiae sint expertia, praecellant; et ab illis quidem simplici qua
quam sensilia intelligentis essentiae notiones habeant, ipsius vero imagines sint, et partibiliter
exempla; et ut paucis rem complectar, in vestibulis quidem primarum formarum sint collo
patefaciant, nondum vero partitionem, et compositionem rationum, convenientemque imagini
transcurrant, et ipsis simplicibus, et ab omni materia expurgatis cognitionibus cohereant. Me
esse intelligatur. Medium utique complens inter impartibiles prorsus essentias, et eas, qu
‘one hand, and divisible substances which are bounded by parts,
and by manyfold compositions and different divisions, on the
other. Indeed, with regard to the reasonings which are taught
in [mathematics] itself, [mathematics] holds itself always in
the same way, and [this way] is firm and cannot be refuted; it
shows that it, in itself is superior to forms which are held in
matter. But this faculty of advancing which comprehends, and
besides it both uses the dimensions of things subjected to it,
and derives different things from different principles, offers
itself an inferior rank; according to this rank which [mathemat-
ics] obtains it is indivisible, and is perfectly arranged in itself by
nature.111 But mathematics, and all things, in general, which are subjected
to thinking, have been allotted a middle place. They are superior
to those things which are conceived by division, and take prece-
dence over sense objects, since they are free of matter. They are
superior to the first (divisible things) in a simple manner, and
take precedence over the second (sense objects) for a sure rea-
son. And they have more open notions of intelligent being than
sense objects, but are still only reflections of it. And in a divisible
fashion they imitate exemplars which are indivisible, and in a
multiform manner exemplars which are uniform. To cut it short,
they are placed in the vestibule of the prime forms, and open
before them an existence which is unified and indivisible and
fertile, although they themselves cannot overcome division,
and composite reasons, and a substance which is appropriate
for images; nor can they bypass the different mental notions
which have the force of thought, and join the simple cognitions
which are free of all matter. The middle position between taken
by the genera and forms of mathematics can be understood in
this description. They occupy a middle position between plainly
indivisible essences and those which, related to matter, are
divisible.112
We find in these two passages from Proclus expressions like
partibiliter quidem impartibilia, multiformiter autem uniformia exem-
pla (
), which resemble (from the rhetorical-dialectical
aspect common to Neoplatonic literature) Patrizi’s formula corpus
incorporeum et incorporeum corpus. There is no doubt that thecontinui et discreti, ante materiam esse, est manifestum’.
non qua ratione veteres dixere, per abstractionem a rebus naturalibus corpoream
corpore suo, cum naturae rebus, corporibusque affinitatem habeat, quo ad eorum
referat. Sitque illi proximius, quam corpus naturae ullum. Eadem hac rationum
us, et habendam et tradendam esse, quam vel naturalem, vel eam quae hominum
c ipsa opera spacio itidem sunt posteriora’.
s, neque ex ultimis, a simplicique essentia seiunctis esse necesse est, sed medium
s; et partibiles, atque in multiplicibus compositionibus, variisque divisionibus
, et firmum est, neque confutari potest, formis, quae in materia feruntur ipsam
m dimensionibus preterea utitur, et que ab aliis principiis alia preparat, inferiorem
rfecte constituta natura’. For the Greek see Proclus (1873), p. 3:
.’
unt, medium sortita sunt ordinem. Cum ea quidem, quae intelliguntur divisione
dam vi superentur, his autem certa quadam ratione prestent; et apertiores quidem
quidem impartibilia, multiformiter autem uniformia eorum, quae sunt imitentur
cata, illarumque in unum coactam, et impartibilem, et foecundam existentiam
bus substantiam superent, nec varias, et cogitandi vim habentes animae notiones
dietas itaque Mathematicorum generum, ac formarum, in presentia huiuscemodi
ae circa materiam partibiles fiunt’. For the Greek see Proclus (1873), pp. 4–5:
’
.
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we find in Proclus than to Aristotle, whom Patrizi constantly and
explicitly criticizes. But Patrizi, while being to some extent influ-
enced by Proclus, is focused on the concept of space which is,
through its unique and special features, the reason for this specific
place of mathematics. Corporeality and incorporeality are Patrizi’s
main terms, through which he characterizes space and locates
mathematics in the middle of these two ontological possibilities
as the science of space. We do not find in Patrizi in this context
any mention of essences or signs of a developed Neoplatonic meta-
physical system as we do in Proclus. The great Neoplatonic philos-
opher, on the other hand, discusses here the essence of
mathematics, and the emphasis in his discussion is on its middle
place between indivisible and divisible substances (and indeed,
we find here the common contrast between divisible, material,
and sensible level, and immaterial, indivisible, and intelligible le-
vel). Although the immateriality of mathematics in Proclus corre-
sponds to its incorporeality in Patrizi, their reasons, explanations,
and conceptual framework as a whole are considerably different.
It is true that, as we have seen, the notion of space as a body comes
from Proclus; but the systematical and consistent development of
this notion and its physical and mathematical implications outside
the Aristotelian categories are Patrizi’s. This is a good example of
how a Renaissance philosopher works with his sources: a careful
reading of sources exercises some influence, but also, in the case
of Patrizi, provokes creativity and originality.
Thus, after showing the essential importance of geometry, on a
purely philosophical level and without mentioning any authorities,
Patrizi can remind his readers, on a rhetorical level, of the famous
inscription at the entrance of Plato’s Academy, and of a Pythago-
rean dictum (‘everything was created from finite and infinite’), to
which he adds that this saying should be understood with regard
to the first space.113 He immediately moves on to present a compar-
ison between geometry and arithmetic, starting with the common
elements, and then mentioning the specific features of each science,
and what each of them gives to the other.114 Patrizi’s final accord in
his discussion of mathematical space is listing the names of useful
sciences which originated from geometry and arithmetic,115 in order
to refute Aristotle’s argument that mathematics is useless in regard
to human life, while emphasizing again that space is the source of
mathematics.116
The relatively rare words, terms, and phrases used by Patrizi in
his discussion of space (such as formatrix, ratio sensata, renitentia,
fabrefactus, aptitudo, extensio hypostatica) do not indicate or reveal,
in most cases, his direct sources, but rather his originality. They
show that he tried to bring to the fore a new scientific terminology
which should replace the common Aristotelian one. Since the con-
temporary scientific discourse was identified with, and determined
by, Aristotelian terms and assumptions, it was essential for Patrizi
to offer his readers an alternative terminology with which he pre-
sented his own scientific novel point of view, taking into account
the tensions he found in the ancient sources with regard to the
concept of space, and using mainly some Stoic and Neoplatonic
ideas and developing, under some influence of Proclus’ commen-
tary on Euclid, a geometrical cosmos in his critique of Aristotle’s
physics.117 Patrizi’s awareness of the importance of different ways
of presentation and persuasion, of rhetoric and dialectic in the scien-113 Patrizi (1591), fol. 68r: ‘Rectae foribus scholae divini Platonis fuit praefixum. Geometria
omnia ortum habuisse, quando de spacio primo id intellexisse comperiantur’.
114 Ibid., fol. 68v.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.: ‘Quarum scientiarum, si quae est in hominum vita utilitas, ea omnis in illas du
scientiam hisce libris a nobis omnium primis exaratam est referenda. Unde falsam fuisse
117 For Patrizi’s overall metaphysical system, containing degrees, series, and chains, which
said to be a three-dimensional figure bounded by three adjacent triangles, that is, a tetrahed
triangular shape as well’, see Deitz (1999), p. 143.tific discourse, and of terminology which determines this discourse,
came directly from the humanists and the new humanistic methods
and disciplines which were included under phrases like artes
sermonales and studia humanitatis. Patrizi’s notion of space (either
physical or mathematical) contains two meanings, which correspond
to the ontological and the epistemological levels. On the ontological
level it is space in the technical sense; but on a more general and less
technical sense which is found in Patrizi, indeed on the epistemolog-
ical level, it should be interpreted as discourse. And thus, I contend, it
is also possible to translate the titles of these books as ‘The physical
discourse’ and ‘The mathematical discourse’. In this respect, France-
sco Patrizi is a very good case of a humanist philosopher.
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